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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A “DISACKNOWLEDGMENT” OF POST-SECONDARY STUDENT
FREE SPEECH—BROWN v. LI AND THE APPLICABILITY OF
HAZELWOOD v. KUHLMEIER TO THE POST-SECONDARY
SETTING

I. INTRODUCTION
By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there by those
having the right to control him, [the student] necessarily surrenders very many
of his individual rights. How his time shall be occupied; what his habits shall
be; his general deportment; . . . his hours of study and recreation,—in all these
matters, and many others, he must yield obedience to those who, for the time
being, are his masters . . . .1

Fortunately for today’s undergraduate and graduate students, such a
view—at least in theory—no longer prevails. However, sometimes, the more
things change, the more they seem to stay the same. As will be the focus of
this Note, in the realm of First Amendment free speech rights, applying the
deferential Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier2 standard to the post-secondary setting
would likely perpetuate the control of university officials, albeit in a less
dramatic form.
The free speech rights of students are frequently pitted against the free
speech rights of teachers and school administrators. When such a collision of
rights occurs, the courts must intervene. The United States Supreme Court’s
intervention resulted in a trilogy of cases that has shaped and defined
jurisprudence in this area at the pre-collegiate level—the Tinker-FraserHazelwood trilogy.3
The jurisprudence surrounding this collision of rights in the educational
setting has been a jurisprudence of distinctions. Courts have made distinctions
between the types of speech at issue. Thus, First Amendment caselaw in the
educational setting can be categorized into cases dealing with lewd, vulgar, and
plainly offensive speech, “school-sponsored speech,” and other speech that
1. Todd Edward Pettys, Note, Punishing Offensive Conduct on University Campuses: Iota
Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 72 N.C. L. REV. 789, 799
(1994) (quoting North v. Bd. of Trs., 27 N.E. 54, 56 (Ill. 1891)).
2. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). This Note will only address students’ free speech rights in the
public school setting.
3. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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“happens to occur on the school premises,” or pure speech.4 In addition, courts
have made distinctions based on the medium through which, or the place
where, the speech was communicated.5 Thus, First Amendment caselaw can
also be categorized depending on whether the speech was made in a traditional
public forum, in a limited public forum, or in a nonpublic forum.6 One
distinction, though, that courts consistently have failed to make is the
distinction between free speech rights at the primary and secondary school
level as opposed to free speech rights at the undergraduate and graduate school
level.7
The source of much of the confusion and disagreement in this complex and
sensitive area of the law has stemmed from a footnote in the 1988 Hazelwood
case.8 In Hazelwood, a case dealing with a high school newspaper, the Court
held that educators’ actions to censor student speech did not violate the First
Amendment “so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.”9 However, in the now infamous footnote seven, the
Court specifically limited its holding to the high school level: “We need not
now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect
to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.”10
Almost fifteen years later, the Supreme Court has yet to answer this question,
and the lower courts have failed to agree on what degree of deference should
be afforded officials at the college level.11
The confusion caused by footnote seven is readily apparent in the recent
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Brown v. Li.12 Christopher Brown, a
master’s degree candidate at the University of California at Santa Barbara,
claimed that his First Amendment rights were violated.13 The committee
reviewing his thesis initially approved it, but afterwards, Brown added a
“Disacknowledgments” section, complete with profanity and criticism of
school officials.14 The committee, upon finding out about the section, refused

4. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 136-43 and Part III.B.
8. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
9. Id. at 273.
10. Id. at 273 n.7.
11. See infra Part II.D.2.
12. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003). For a more in-depth
discussion of the facts and opinions in Brown, see infra Part III.
13. Brown, 308 F.3d at 941-42.
14. Id. at 943. This “Disacknowledgments” section was basically the antithesis of the
“traditional” Acknowledgment, or dedication, section that some students choose to submit with
their writings. For a more in-depth discussion of the content of Brown’s “Disacknowledgments”
section, see infra Part III.A.
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to approve the section, even after Brown removed the profanity.15 The Dean of
the school informed Brown that he would not receive his degree if his thesis
were not approved, and that his thesis would not be approved unless Brown
removed the “Disacknowledgements” section.16 These facts resulted in a
fragmented opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Two judges
concluded that Brown’s rights were not violated by the school’s refusal to
allow him to include the “Disacknowledgments” section, but for drastically
different reasons.17 One of these judges reasoned that Brown’s rights were not
violated because, as a matter of first impression for the Ninth Circuit,
Hazelwood applied at the college level, and thus, the school official’s actions
were justified under the deferential Hazelwood standard.18
Although Brown creates no binding precedent19 and, at first glance, may
seem of little importance, the underlying issues at stake and the arguments
made for extending the deferential Hazelwood standard to the college arena
have far-reaching implications for free speech rights at the post-secondary
level. Applying Hazelwood to the post-secondary setting would ignore wellsettled precedents,20 and could result in the free speech rights of an
undergraduate or graduate student—who could be in his or her twenties,
thirties, forties, or even older—receiving the same protection as the free speech
rights of a kindergartener.21 Moreover, although the Brown court attempted to
limit its reasoning to curriculum-related speech, the possibility exists that
Hazelwood could be extended in the post-secondary setting to extracurricular
speech as well.22 In addition, there is a risk that if a clear distinction is not
made between the pre-collegiate and collegiate school environments in free
speech cases, courts may be willing to extend analyses utilized in pre-

15. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943-44.
16. Id. at 944.
17. Id. at 957 (Reinhardt J., dissenting). For a more in-depth discussion and analysis of the
judges’ opinions, see infra Parts III.B and III.C.
18. Id. at 951-53.
19. See infra note 179.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. Of course, under the Hazelwood analysis emotional maturity is taken into account. See
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
However, both
primary/secondary and post-secondary students’ speech rights still could be violated if the
school’s actions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273. Even if
emotional maturity is a factor to consider, the fact of the matter remains that the standard would
be easier for post-secondary school officials to meet. See infra note 267 and accompanying text
(noting that the majority of courts applying Hazelwood have come out in favor of the school
officials).
22. See infra notes 110, 266-67 and accompanying text.
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collegiate cases to higher education cases in areas besides the First
Amendment.23
Although others have examined collegiate level cases that have applied the
Hazelwood analysis24 and argued that Hazelwood should not extend to the
post-secondary setting,25 they have not done so in the context of the recent
Brown case and the unique reasoning employed by the Ninth Circuit.26
Moreover, this Note will identify other areas of the law beyond free speech
that have created distinctions between the secondary and post-secondary
school settings.27
Part II of this Note consists of a historical analysis of the underlying issues
at stake in Brown v. Li, focusing on how courts have made distinctions
between the pre-collegiate and collegiate environments. Part III gives a
detailed account of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Brown v. Li.
Part IV provides an analysis of the various opinions in Brown, as well as an
analysis of the following proposed standards for courts to apply in the place of
Hazelwood: (1) a modified Hazelwood standard; (2) a “student-friendly”
Tinker standard; (3) a limited public forum standard; (4) an intermediate level
of scrutiny standard, or (5) a standard reminiscent of those presented in Healy
v. James28 and Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri.29
Part V concludes that the Supreme Court needs to resolve the unanswered
Hazelwood issue to clear up the confusion in the lower courts and should do so
by continuing its tradition of safeguarding free speech in the university setting.
By doing so, the Court will give due credit to the uniqueness of the post-

23. Gail Sorenson & Andrew S. LaManque, The Application of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier in
College Litigation, 22 J.C. & U.L. 971, 974 (1996) (noting that “application to higher education
cases of rationales developed in pre-collegiate cases may spread beyond First Amendment speech
issues, however important, to unduly limit collegiate faculty and student freedom in other
important respects.”).
24. See generally id. This article chronicled the ten cases in higher education that had cited
Hazelwood at the time the article was written. Sorenson and LaManque’s article is an excellent
starting point. This Note will both incorporate and update the higher education cases citing
Hazelwood.
25. See, e.g., Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case
Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2002). Fiore
comments on the issue of whether Hazelwood should extend to the college level, principally in
the context of the Sixth Circuit decision of Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en
banc). Although this Note comes to the same conclusion as Fiore’s article, it does so for different
reasons, and also examines the issue in the context of Brown.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See infra Part II.E.
28. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
29. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
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secondary setting and will ensure the continued viability of the “marketplace of
ideas.”30
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A.

Landmark Trilogy: First Amendment Rights in the Public School Setting

The landmark cases discussed below have formed the foundation of
American jurisprudence concerning the collision of First Amendment rights in
the school setting. Although all three cases concern pre-collegiate free speech
rights, many lower courts use them to define the scope of First Amendment
rights in the college and university settings.31
As the Supreme Court once noted:
“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools.” The classroom is peculiarly the
“marketplace of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
“out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative
selection.”32

This fundamental principle was reaffirmed in the first case of the Supreme
Court trilogy, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.33
In Tinker, three students, ages thirteen, fifteen, and sixteen years old, wanted to
protest the Vietnam War and advocate peace by wearing black armbands to

30. The notion of the “marketplace of ideas” was first expressed by Justice Holmes in his
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice
Holmes wrote:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country.
Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
31. See infra notes 139-143 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts III.B.1, 3.
32. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted).
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a more in-depth
analysis of Tinker, see, for example, Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and
Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 628-30, 650-54 (2002).
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school.34 Upon hearing about the students’ intentions, school officials
immediately adopted a policy that led to the disciplining of any student who
wore such an armband to school.35 Despite the policy, the students chose to
wear the armbands and they were disciplined accordingly. They claimed that
school officials representing the high school and junior high school violated
their First Amendment right to free speech.36
The Tinker majority first concluded, in an oft-cited statement, “It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”37 Noting that the
case did “not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing,
[or] to hair style,”38 the Court characterized the type of speech at issue as “pure
speech.”39 In order to restrict a student’s speech, the school must show that the
speech would “‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’”40 Importantly, the
school “must be able to show that its action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint,”41 and that “school officials cannot
suppress ‘expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.’”42
Thus, the Tinker Court afforded students broad First Amendment protection.43
The Supreme Court retreated from Tinker’s broad protection of students’
free speech rights in Bethel School District v. Fraser.44 Fraser, a high school

34. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 506.
38. Id. at 507-08. The regulations the Court chose to list are regulations one might typically
expect to find at the primary and secondary school level, not at the post-secondary level.
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
40. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 511 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).
43. Even Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, noted the expansiveness of the decision.
See id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating “I cannot share the Court’s uncritical
assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive
with those of adults.”).
44. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). For a more in-depth
discussion of Fraser, see, for example, Royal C. Gardner, Note, Protecting a School’s Interest in
Value Inculcation to the Detriment of Students’ Free Expression Rights: Bethel School District v.
Fraser, 28 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1987). Gardner analyzed the Fraser decision itself and the probable
“chilling effect” of the decision. Id. at 599. In addition, Gardner noted the following, in
anticipation of the Hazelwood decision: “Much of the uncertainty that Fraser will produce can be
avoided if the Supreme Court narrows Fraser’s scope in its upcoming decision of Kuhlmeier v.
Hazelwood School District.” Id. at 624. However, as this Note will demonstrate, Hazelwood has
only created more confusion. See also Philip J. Prygoski, Low Value Speech: From Young to
Fraser, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 317, 345-53 (1987) (discussing the facts of the case and rationale of
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student, used what the Court characterized as an “elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor” in a speech he gave to nominate another student for a
student elective office.45 Distinguishing the “political ‘message’” at issue in
Tinker from the “sexual” message at issue in Fraser, the Court held that the
“vulgar speech and lewd conduct [were] wholly inconsistent with the
‘fundamental values’ of public school education” and “would undermine the
school’s basic educational mission.”46 The Court’s reasoning is replete with
references to age. For example, the Court noted the following:
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public
discourse . . . . It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an
offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the
speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to
children in a public school . . . . [T]he constitutional rights of students in
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings.47

In addition, the Court noted that “[t]he speech could well be seriously
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old
and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.”48
Like Fraser, Hazelwood also limited the First Amendment free speech
rights of students at the high school level.49 The Court narrowly framed the
issue in Hazelwood as “the extent to which educators may exercise editorial
control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the
school’s journalism curriculum.”50 Hazelwood school officials deleted two
pages from the Spectrum, a newspaper written and edited by students in the
the Court’s decision along with a critique of the Court’s analysis). For a more modern analysis
and interpretation of Fraser, see, for example, Miller, supra note 33, at 629-31, 654-60.
45. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78. The nominating student delivered the following speech:
“I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is
firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
“Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing
and pushing until finally—he succeeds.
“Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of
you.
“So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best
our high school can be.”
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting from the student’s nominating speech).
46. Id. at 685-86.
47. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 683 (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that the Court’s “First
Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the
speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience
may include children.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added).
49. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
50. Id. at 262.
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high school’s journalism class.51 The Spectrum’s principal deleted the two
pages because, in addition to including articles the adviser did not object to, the
pages also included stories about divorce and pregnancy, with references to
sexual activity and birth control.52
The Court first considered the issue of whether the Spectrum could be
characterized as a public forum, for if it could, the speech contained therein
would receive greater First Amendment protection.53 The Court found that the
school, both in practice and in policy, intended for the Spectrum to be “part of
the educational curriculum and a ‘regular classroom activit[y],’”54 and that the
school “fail[ed] to demonstrate the ‘clear intent [required] to create a public
forum.’”55 The Court explained that “school facilities may be deemed to be
public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened
those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public,’ or by some
segment of the public, such as student organizations.”56
The Court distinguished Tinker as the issue in Tinker was whether the
school was required to tolerate the student’s speech, whereas the issue in
Hazelwood was whether the school would be required to affirmatively promote
particular student speech.57 The Court defined the Tinker category as
including “a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises,” whereas the Hazelwood category included speech that “members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school . . .
[and] may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum . . . .”58
School officials could regulate such “school-sponsored” speech falling into the
Hazelwood category “so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”59 In regulating the speech, school officials
51. Id.
52. Id. at 263-64.
53. Id. at 267.
54. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268. The Court listed the factors that influenced its
determination: “[the adviser] selected the editors of the newspaper, scheduled publication dates,
decided the number of pages for each issue, assigned story ideas to class members, advised
students on the development of their stories, reviewed the use of quotations, edited stories, [etc.].”
Id.
55. Id. at 270 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985)).
56. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47, 46
(1983)).
57. Id. at 271.
58. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. The Court listed as examples of the Hazelwood category of
speech “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities.”
Id. The Court also noted that such activities could be characterized as part of the curriculum,
“whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by
faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.” Id.
59. Id. at 273.
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could “take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience.”60
School officials, the Court noted, would be able to regulate speech dealing
with the topics such as “the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school
setting . . . [and] the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school
setting.”61 The Court intimated that courts could intervene only in the narrow
category of circumstances where such purportedly school-sponsored activities
serve “no valid educational purpose . . . [and] ‘directly and sharply
implicate[]’” First Amendment principles.62
In applying the standard, the Court found that it was reasonable for the
school to have concluded that the students did not adequately master all of the
requirements of the journalism class.63 Hence, the deleting of the two pages,
even though they also contained unobjectionable content, was reasonably
related to pedagogical interests under the deferential standard.64
B.

The Starting Point: Public Forum Analysis65

After Hazelwood, the determination of how to analyze a student’s free
speech claim became inextricably bound up with the public forum doctrine, for
if the expressive activity occurs in a nonpublic forum, then Hazelwood will
apply.66 Thus, after determining whether the interest at issue is speech under
the First Amendment, a court must engage in a forum analysis to determine if
the speech occurred in a traditional forum, a limited public forum, or a
nonpublic forum.67 The Supreme Court delineated the basic forum doctrine in
60. Id. at 272.
61. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
62. Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 276.
64. Id. at 276.
65. Please note that this is a complicated and unsettled area of the law that cannot be
discussed in full here. For a more in-depth analysis of the public forum doctrine and the
complications that arise during its application, see Brian S. Black, Note, The Public School:
Beyond the Fringes of Public Forum Analysis?, 36 VILL. L. REV. 831 (1991) (arguing that the
public forum analysis should not have been incorporated into this area of the law); James M.
Henderson, Sr., The Public Forum Doctrine in Schools, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 529, 532, 534
(1995) (arguing that the application of the public forum doctrine in the school setting is the
“principal danger” to students’ First Amendment rights and noting that “[l]ower standards of
scrutiny will be applied to governmental restrictions on student speech activities where one
applies the public forum doctrine rather than Tinker and its progeny.”); Matthew D. McGill, Note,
Unleashing the Limited Public Forum Analysis: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine,
52 STAN. L. REV. 929 (2000).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56; see also Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342,
346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“Because we find that a forum analysis requires that the
yearbook be analyzed as a limited public forum—rather than a nonpublic forum—we agree with
the parties that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”).
67. Lee Rudy, Note, A Procedural Approach to Limited Public Forum Cases, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1255, 1257-63 (1995).
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the oft-cited case of Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local Educator’s
Association.68 At one extreme are traditional public forums, which, under
Perry, are “places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate.”69 Governmental regulation of the “time,
place, and manner of expression” in these “quintessential public forums” is
subject to three limitations: the regulation must be (1) “content-neutral” and
espouse no viewpoint discrimination; (2) “narrowly tailored to serve a
[compelling] government interest;” and (3) must “leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.”70
At the other extreme are nonpublic forums—forums that have not, either
through “tradition or designation,” been declared public.71 In such forums, the
time, manner, and place of expressive activity can be restricted “as long as the
regulation[s] on speech [are] reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”72
Thus, regulations in a nonpublic forum can be made based on content, but not
on viewpoint. As the Supreme Court explained in Cornelius v. NAACP:
Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter
and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. Although a
speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a
topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a

68. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, the
Indiana Board of Education allowed one teachers’ union access to the interschool mail system
and teacher mailboxes in Perry Township schools (based on a collective bargaining agreement),
but denied access by all other teachers’ unions. Id. at 39. An excluded union alleged, in part, that
this violated the teachers’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The Court held that the
school mail system was not a public forum, for, inter alia, the “general public” could not use the
mail system. Id. at 47. Thus, the Court analyzed whether the Board of Education’s restrictions
were “reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.” Id. at 49. Ultimately,
the Court held that the policy and practice was reasonable, reasoning that (1) “providing exclusive
access to recognized bargaining representatives is a permissible labor practice in the public
sector,” and (2) there were alternative channels of communication available to the other unions.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 51, 53.
69. Id. at 45. Some examples of traditional public forums are streets and parks. Id. More
examples of traditional public forums include “town squares, public sidewalks, and state and
federal capitol complexes.” Suzanne Stone Montgomery, Note, When the Klan Adopts-AHighway: The Weaknesses of the Public Forum Doctrine Exposed, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 557, 563
(1999). In the context of traditional public forums, the Court basically has made an a priori
determination that “the citizen’s interest in free expression will . . . outweigh the state’s interest in
preserving order.” Rudy, supra note 67, at 1259.
70. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
71. Id. at 46. “Examples of nonpublic forums are street light posts, prisons, military
reservations, polling places, statutorially[sic]-required meetings of school administrators and a
teachers union, and a school district’s internal mail system.” Montgomery, supra note 69, at 568.
72. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was
created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to
a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise
includible subject.73

The Court’s rationale for not allowing viewpoint discrimination is because of
“the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal but to suppress unpopular ideas or information . . . .”74
In the middle lies the “limited public forum,” created when the government
opens an otherwise non-traditional, nonpublic forum “for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity.”75 Although the government has the discretion to
create a limited public forum, “[t]he Constitution forbids a state to enforce
certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public . . . .”76
Moreover, although the government “is not required to indefinitely retain the
open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”77 In a limited public forum,

73. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). At issue in Cornelius was “whether the Federal Government violates
the First Amendment when it excludes legal defense and political advocacy organizations from
participation in the Combined Federal Campaign . . . a charity drive aimed at federal employees.”
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797-806. President Kennedy issued an Executive Order allowing “[o]nly
tax exempt, nonprofit charitable organizations that were supported by contributions from the
public and that provided direct health and welfare services to individuals” to participate in the
Campaign. Id. at 792. Among the groups excluded from participation included the NAACP, the
Sierra Club, and the Federally Employed Women Legal Defense and Education Fund. Id. at 793.
After noting that “the charitable solicitation of funds” was a form of protected speech under the
First Amendment, the Court analyzed whether the Combined Federal Campaign was a public
forum. Id. at 797-806. The Court held that the Combined Federal Campaign was a nonpublic
forum since it had been the government’s practice and policy to limit participation in the
Campaign. Id. The Court further found that the government’s interest in avoiding “the
appearance of political favoritism” provided a reasonable justification for excluding certain
organizations. Id. at 809.
74. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). See also Rosenberger v.
Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”). A circuit split has developed over whether the
notion of viewpoint neutrality is required when analyzing nonpublic forums under the rubric of
Hazelwood. This issue will be analyzed more fully in this Note. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
75. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. More specifically, a limited public forum can be “created by
government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for
assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.”
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. In some instances, courts have declared the following to be limited
public forums: “university meeting facilities, municipal theaters, and school board meetings.”
Montgomery, supra note 69, at 567.
76. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
77. Id. at 46.
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the government is forbidden from exercising viewpoint discrimination.78 To
determine whether a limited public forum has been created, a court must look
to the “policy and practice of the government,”79 and “will not find that a
[limited] public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a
contrary intent . . . .”80
However, even before determining how to characterize the forum, a court
must determine what constitutes the forum. The Supreme Court has expanded
the definition of forum beyond the notion of a “physical situs” to include
“intangible channels of communication” as well.81 A medium for expressive
activity can constitute a forum, even if “more in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographic sense . . . .”82 A court’s characterization of the forum at
issue, then, can have a substantial impact on the outcome of any given case.
C. Pre-Hazelwood Positions: Student Speech Safeguarded
In 1972 and 1973, the Supreme Court decided two cases that defined the
Court’s role in protecting the free speech rights of university students. Unlike
Hazelwood, these cases emphasized that the free speech rights of students were
akin to the rights of those outside of the school setting. Although the Justices
recognized the competing interests of school officials in maintaining control,
they provided much less deference to the university officials than was provided
by the Hazelwood standard of “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
interests.”83
In Healy v. James,84 students trying to form a chapter of the Students for a
Democratic Society on the Central Connecticut State College campus claimed
that their First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association
were violated when school officials refused to officially recognize the
organization.85 The Court identified the collision of interests in the case as the
78. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. A simple example illustrates the Court’s point: “When a
government builds a theater, for example, it creates a limited public forum open to theatrical
productions. Other forms of expression, such as petitioning, would not be welcome in a theater,
and they could therefore be excluded on a reasonable basis. The government cannot exclude a
particular theatrical production from the theater, however, without a compelling justification.”
Rudy, supra note 67, at 1261.
79. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
80. Id. at 803 (emphasis added). The Court also noted the following: “In cases where the
principal function of the property would be disrupted by expressive activity, the Court is
particularly reluctant to hold that the government intended to designate a public forum.” Id. at
804.
81. Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 476 (1st Cir.
1989).
82. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
83. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
84. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
85. Id. at 170.
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interest of those, including the school officials, in an “environment free from
disruptive interference with the educational process” and the “interest in the
widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with the maintenance
of order.”86
Citing Tinker, the Court reaffirmed the application of the First Amendment
at the college and university level.87 It held that universities have the ability to
prohibit “lawless action” as well as actions, per Tinker, that “materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”88 Significantly,
however, the Court relied on reasoning that was not present in Tinker, a high
school level case. For example, after discussing Tinker and the principles
discussed therein, the Court noted that “the precedents of this Court leave no
room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than
in the community at large.”89 The Court further explained, “While a college
has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus . . . a ‘heavy
burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that
action.”90 This heavy burden would not be satisfied “simply because [school
officials] find[] the views expressed . . . to be abhorrent.”91 Thus, although the
Court did rely on a high school case, it defined the flexible and vague Tinker
standard for the university setting.
In Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,92 a thirty-two
year old graduate student claimed her First Amendment rights were violated
when she was expelled from Journalism school after distributing a newspaper
that included a political cartoon with profanity and a depiction of a policeman
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.93 The Court relied on
Healy for the proposition that the “mere dissemination of ideas—no matter
how offensive to good taste—on a state university cammpus[sic] may not be
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”94 The Court held that
the only restrictions that the school could impose were reasonable time,
manner, and place restrictions.95

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 171.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 189 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added).
Id. at 184.
Id. at 187-88.
410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
Id. at 667.
Id. at 670.
Id.
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D. Hazelwood Applied: Student Speech Stifled
With the Hazelwood decision in hand—complete with the soon-to-be
problematic footnote seven—it was time for the lower courts to grapple with
defining the parameters of the Hazelwood doctrine, both at the pre-collegiate
and post-secondary levels. When confronted with pre-collegiate student free
speech cases, lower courts applied the Hazelwood doctrine with consistency,
however when confronted with post-secondary student speech cases, the only
consistency that is apparent in the lower courts is confusion.
1.

Pre-collegiate Caselaw

Lower courts have repeatedly applied Hazelwood to student speech at the
high school level.96 In doing so, they have often relied on the peculiarities of
the pre-collegiate audience to justify their decisions.97
For example, in the 1989 case Virgil v. School Board of Columbia County,
Florida,98 the Eleventh Circuit relied on Hazelwood in upholding a high school
board’s decision to ban a textbook from a class because of its vulgar and
sexual content.99 Although the court explicitly stated that it did not approve of
the board’s decision, it nonetheless felt compelled to follow Hazelwood.100 In

96. See, e.g., McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F. Supp. 2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
(applying Hazelwood to uphold high school officials’ decision to prevent the high school
marching band from performing “White Rabbit” as reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns because school officials reasonably believed it promoted the use of illegal drugs).
97. See, e.g., Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999). In Henerey, a
high school student running for student body president was disqualified after handing out
condoms attached to stickers bearing his slogan, “Adam Henerey, The Safe Choice,” without first
receiving permission. Id. at 1131. The court held that “the election was a school-sponsored
activity that was a part of the school’s curriculum” and that the school had a legitimate
pedagogical concern in “divorcing its extracurricular programs from controversial and sensitive
topics, such as teenage sex.” Id. at 1133, 1136. The court went on to note that “there [can] be
[no] . . . doubt that teenage sex is a controversial topic in the public schools,” evidenced by the
fact that parents of primary and secondary school students have brought suits against school
districts for exposing their children to “offensive or graphic materials without their consent.” Id.
at 1136. See also Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 758, 763 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that
Hazelwood applied to “discourteous” and “rude” remarks that a high school student made about
his “schoolmasters” in a student assembly because “hurting the feelings of others” does not have
a legitimate place in the high school curriculum).
98. 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1518. The works banned by the school included classics such as “Lysistrata,
written by the Greek dramatist Aristophanes in approximately 411 B.C., and The Miller’s Tale,
written by the English poet Geoffrey Chaucer around 1380-1390 A.D.” Id. at 1519. According
to the court, the works contained “passages of exceptional sexual explicitness.” Id. at 1523. The
court recited portions of the works deemed by some commentators to have sexual overtones. Id.
at 1524 n.9.
100. Virgil, 863 F.2d at 1525. The court stated:
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deciding that the school board’s decision did not violate the Constitution, the
court specifically took into account “the fact that most of the high school
students involved ranged in age from fifteen to just over eighteen, and a
substantial number had not yet reached the age of majority.”101 In doing so,
the court restricted the applicability of Hazelwood to the high school level.102
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also applied Hazelwood to a high
school student’s speech in Settle v. Dickson.103 A ninth-grade student, Brittney
Settle, changed her paper topic from “Drama” to “The Life of Jesus Christ”
without getting her teacher’s permission and, as a result, she received a zero on
the paper.104 The Court, relying on Hazelwood, rejected the argument that her
First Amendment free speech rights were violated.105 It held that school
officials would not violate the First Amendment so long as they limited a
student’s grades or speech as part of the curriculum and did not do so as a
pretext for punishing the student.106 In coming to this conclusion, the court
referred to Settle as a “young student” and noted that teachers “must daily
decide . . . when it is time to stop writing or talking.”107 Both statements are
indicative of a pre-collegiate, not a collegiate setting. Importantly, the court
also stated, “[l]earning is more vital in the classroom than free speech,” but, for
reasons discussed below, such a view is inapposite in the college setting.108
Moreover, in applying Hazelwood to the high school setting, many courts
have interpreted Hazelwood very expansively. For example, in Fleming v.
Jefferson County School District,109 the Tenth Circuit held that “‘[t]he universe

We decide today only that the Board’s removal of these works from the curriculum did
not violate the Constitution. Of course, we do not endorse the Board’s decision. Like the
district court, we seriously question how young persons just below the age of majority can
be harmed by these masterpieces of Western literature. However, having concluded that
there is no constitutional violation, our role is not to second guess the wisdom of the
Board’s action.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1523 (“[W]e cannot conclude that the school board’s actions were not reasonably
related to its legitimate concerns regarding the appropriateness (for this high school audience) of
the sexuality and the vulgarity in these works.”) (emphasis added).
103. 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995).
104. Id. at 153-54.
105. Id. at 153.
106. Id. at 155.
107. Id. at 155-56.
108. Settle, 53 F.3d. at 156. For reasons why such a view is inapposite in the post-secondary
setting, see infra Part IV.A.1.b.
109. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002). This case concerned Columbine High School, the
Colorado high school where two students opened fire on their teachers and fellow classmates. Id.
at 920. The school decided to allow students to place painted tiles around the school to help with
the healing process. Id. at 920-21. However, “there could be no references to the attack, to the
date of the attack . . . no names or initials of students, no Columbine ribbons, no religious
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of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the
academic . . . [for it includes] discipline, courtesy, and respect for
authority.’”110 The court further explained, “the Hazelwood standard does not
require that the guidelines be ‘the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation[s],’ only that they be reasonable.”111 Because Hazelwood is
susceptible to such an expansive interpretation, cases such as Fleming forecast
the catastrophically detrimental chilling effect that would befall post-secondary
students’ free speech rights if Hazelwood were to apply.
2.

Collegiate Caselaw

a.

Supreme Court Silence

As earlier noted, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the question of
whether the Hazelwood standard applies in the university setting.112 The Court
has yet to revisit the issue. However, the most recent Supreme Court case to
provide an indication as to what the Court might decide in the future is Board
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth.113 In
Southworth, University of Wisconsin students alleged, inter alia, that the
mandatory student activity fee violated their First Amendment right of free
speech because some of their money funded organizations that did not gain the
students’ approval.114 Buried within a footnote in Justice Souter’s concurring
opinion is the following statement: “[C]ases dealing with the right of teaching
institutions to limit expressive freedom of students have been confined to high
schools, whose students and their schools’ relations to them are different and
at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college

symbols, and nothing obscene or offensive.” Id. at 921. The plaintiffs wanted to place, inter alia,
religious symbols on their tiles. Id. After noting that the “district court read Hazelwood as only
applying ‘to activities conducted as part of the school curriculum,’” the Fleming court then stated
the following: “We believe this reading of Hazelwood is too narrow. We read the Court’s
definition of ‘school-sponsored’ speech to mean activities that might reasonably be perceived to
bear the imprimatur of the school and that involve pedagogical concerns.” Fleming, 298 F.3d at
924. The court concluded that the project was school-sponsored speech, even though the
“painting activity took place outside of school hours and was not mandatory,” and even despite a
school official that had explicitly stated: “this is a project outside of the school, this is a separate
project . . . .” Id. at 930.
110. Id. at 925 (quoting Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989)) (alterations in
original).
111. Id. at 932 (quoting Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir.
1999)) (alterations in original).
112. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988).
113. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
114. Id. at 227. In particular, some students objected to the school using their mandatory fees
to fund organizations that engaged in political and ideological expression at odds with their own
personal beliefs. Id.
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education.”115 Although this footnote is by no means controlling, it does
suggest that the Court might uphold a distinction between the amount of
deference to school officials at the pre-collegiate and collegiate levels when
First Amendment rights are at stake.
b.

Lower Court Applications and Misapplications

A 2001 case, Hosty v. Governors State University, is particularly indicative
of the confusion that has resulted in the lower courts from Hazelwood’s
unanswered footnote seven.116 In Hosty, GSU students and former editors and
writers of the school’s student newspaper, the Innovator, claimed that school
officials violated their First Amendment free speech rights.117 In particular,
they alleged that the school officials violated their rights when, among other
things, the officials denied them access to computer software and manuals,
temporarily removed an Innovator computer without permission, and failed to
investigate break-ins.118 In ruling on the various defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, the court addressed Hazelwood and concluded, contrary to
what the defendants argued, that it did not “cast doubt” on the cases cited by
the plaintiffs in support of their position.119
First, the court distinguished Hazelwood because, unlike the newspaper in
Hazelwood, the students retained editorial control over the Innovator and it
was not part of a class.120 Thus, the court intimated that if the facts of the case
had been different—specifically, if the Innovator was part of the educational
curriculum—Hazelwood could have applied. However, in the next few
sentences, the court seemed to contradict the implication that Hazelwood might
apply at the post-secondary level. Citing footnote seven, the court also
distinguished Hazelwood on the basis that it involved a high school rather than

115. Id. at 238 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A similar
point was made in the 1992 Supreme Court case of Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). In Lee,
a public school student and her father brought a suit against the child’s school district for its
practice of including clergy-led invocations and benedictions in the form of prayer at the schoolsponsored graduation ceremonies. Id. at 580-81. In holding that such a practice was
unconstitutional, the Court reasoned, in relevant part:
We do not address whether that choice [of participating in or protesting the graduation
ceremony] is acceptable if the affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the State
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school
children in this position. Research in psychology supports the common assumption that
adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity . . . .
Id. at 593.
116. Hosty v. Governors State Univ., 2001 WL 1465621 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2001).
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id. at *4.
119. Id. at *7.
120. Id.
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a college or university.121 Thus, the court implied that the deferential
Hazelwood standard would not apply to college and university free speech
cases. Ultimately, the court did not resolve these conflicting implications. As
has happened in many other cases, the court searched for guidance, found
none, did not resolve the question, and left the students, school officials, and
attorneys who must rely on the decision, in a state of confusion.
Some courts, however, have left no one wondering whether Hazelwood
will or should apply at the post-secondary level. For example, in 1989, the
First Circuit confronted the issue in Student Government Association v. Board
of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts.122 In its opinion, the court
stated, “Hazelwood . . . is not applicable to college newspaper cases.”123
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit confronted the Hazelwood issue in Kincaid v.
Gibson.124 Kentucky State University students claimed that their First
Amendment rights were violated when school officials confiscated and refused
to distribute student-produced yearbooks.125 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that the yearbook constituted a limited public forum, and was
thus subject only to reasonable time, manner, and place regulations, and not to
the deferential Hazelwood standard, as the district court concluded.126 Judge
Cole, speaking for the majority, stated:
The danger of “chilling . . . individual thought and expression is especially real
in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and
philosophic tradition.” . . . The university environment is the quintessential
“marketplace of ideas,” which merits full, or indeed heightened, First
Amendment protection . . . . In addition to the nature of the university setting,
we find it relevant that The Thorobred and its readers are likely to be young
adults . . . . Thus, there can be no justification for suppressing the yearbook on
the grounds that it might be “unsuitable for immature audiences.”127

121. Hosty, 2001 WL 1465621, at *7.
122. 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989). Students from the University of Massachusetts alleged that
university officials violated their free speech rights when the university got rid of the Legal
Services Office, which provided legal education and advice to students. Id. at 474-75. The court
ultimately held that this case was to be decided using subsidy caselaw. Id. at 477.
123. Id. at 480 n.6 (citations omitted).
124. 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
125. Id. at 345. The Vice President for Student Affairs, Gibson, objected to the color of the
yearbook’s cover and theme, and criticized the publication for its lack of captions and the
“inclusion of current events ostensibly unrelated to Kentucky State University.” Id.
126. Id. at 346, 348.
127. Id. at 352 (citations omitted). In coming to its conclusion, the court also noted that The
Thorobred was not a “closely-monitored classroom activity.” Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 352.
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Although the court did not explicitly reject the applicability of Hazelwood in
the college setting,128 the language arguably suggests that the Sixth Circuit
might refuse to apply Hazelwood in the future.
Moreover, in the 1990 case of DiBona v. Matthews,129 a community
college student and his teacher brought an action against the college, alleging
that their First Amendment rights had been violated when the school cancelled
a drama class because of the content of the play that was to be performed.130
The court began its constitutional analysis by noting that nearly all the prior
cases dealing with the power of school officials to regulate the content of
drama productions or written materials “involved minors rather than adult
colleges.”131 Instead of relying on Hazelwood, the court looked to the preHazelwood collegiate cases to support its conclusion that the school officials
could not cancel the class and prohibit the production of the play.132 After
noting that Hazelwood had specifically reserved the question of whether its
deferential standard would apply at the college level, the court rejected the
college’s argument that they should be given the same power to regulate
school curriculum as elementary and secondary school officials:
[W]here children are concerned the legitimate role of the government in
regulating speech is substantially broader . . . . In contrast, as the Supreme
Court explained in [Healy], “[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for
the view that . . . First Amendment protections should apply with less force on
college campuses than in the community at large.”133

The DiBona court did not stop there, however. It continued its attack on
the applicability of the Hazelwood standard:
We question whether the rationale underlying the “school sponsorship” rule
would allow its wholesale extension to educational settings involving adults.

128. See id. at 346 n.5 (“Because we find that a forum analysis requires that the yearbook be
analyzed as a limited public forum—rather than a nonpublic forum—we agree with the parties
that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”).
129. 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329 (Ct. App. 1990).
130. Id. at 1333-38. The court’s record recited a description of the play, entitled “Split
Second”:
The play concerns a Black New York City police officer who, in the course of a routine
arrest of a White suspect, is subjected to a flurry of racial slurs and epithets. In a splitsecond loss of control, the officer shoots and kills the suspect. He then places a knife in
the hand of the victim and fabricates a story that the shooting was in self-defense.
Id. at 1333. Church leaders in the community objected to the content of the play. Id.
131. Id. at 1345.
132. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1346. For example, the court relied on the following
language from Papish to support its conclusion: “We think Healy makes it clear that the mere
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university campus
may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’” Id. (quoting Papish v. Univ.
of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973)).
133. Id. (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
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The general public is likely to view school-sponsored student speech as
bearing the “imprimatur of the school” . . . because of the greater control
elementary and secondary schools exercise over the conduct of minor students.
[The school officials] have cited no authority—and we are aware of none—
which would allow a college or university to censor instructor-selected
curriculum materials because they contain “indecent” language or deal with
“offensive” topics.134

Ultimately, the court concluded that although school sponsorship is one factor
that may be considered under some circumstances at the college level, unlike at
the pre-collegiate level, it is not controlling and will not automatically lead to
deference to the school’s legitimate pedagogical interests.135 Thus, according
to the DiBona court, the Hazelwood standard will not apply in the college
setting—at least not in its traditional form.
Many courts have reached similar conclusions when addressing the issue
of whether Hazelwood applies outside of the context of a collision between the
university’s rights and the students’ free speech rights. For example, in Scallet
v. Rosenblum,136 a case addressing the scope of a university instructor’s inclass free speech rights when they collided with the university’s interests, a
Virginia District Court refused to apply the Hazelwood standard.137 In making
this determination, the court opined:
134. Id. at 1346-47 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 1347-48. The court, however, failed to identify under what circumstances school
sponsorship could be considered at the college level. DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1346-47. In
the end, the court held that the school officials’ decision to not allow the play to be performed
was unconstitutional, noting the following:
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without
also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments
might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for
banning the expression of unpopular views. We have been able . . . to discern little social
benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door to such grave results.
Id. at 1348 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)) (alterations in original).
136. 911 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Va. 1996).
137. Id. at 1011. The plaintiff, a non-tenured instructor, alleged that the school failed to
renew his contract “in retaliation for his outspokenness on issues of ‘diversity’” at the Graduate
School. Id. Scallet was somewhat of a progressive instructor, known for “champion[ing], among
other things, the goal of broadening both the traditional focus of classroom materials so as to
make them more accessible to women and minorities, and the traditional underpinnings of the
business community itself, so as to make that sphere more hospitable to the same.” Id. at 1004.
Noting that past precedent provided no “clear guidance,” the court ultimately applied the
Pickering balancing test—a Supreme Court test for determining the amount of protection
afforded teachers’ out-of-class speech—to determine if the instructor’s in-class speech was
protected. Id. at 1011. Under Pickering, courts must balance “the interests of the [employee], as
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Per the terms of this test, the court
concluded that the instructor’s in-class speech regarding “diversity” bordered at times on sexual
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[T]he “significant interests” discussed in Hazelwood that justify the restriction,
in certain instances, of . . . [First Amendment] speech, are not implicated to the
same extent, if at all, in the context of higher education. Certainly the interest
in assuring “that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity” is not implicated in the graduate
school context.138

In contrast to these cases, various courts have not altogether dismissed the
concept of Hazelwood at the university level.139 For example, in Leuth v. St.
Clair County Community College,140 the former editor-in-chief of a student-run
newspaper, the Gazette, challenged the community college officials’ decision
to prohibit the inclusion of an advertisement for a Canadian nude dancing
club.141 Although the court held that the newspaper, a forum for public
expression, would be governed by regulations for commercial speech, it
discussed the Hazelwood standard and extensively compared the student
newspaper at issue in Hazelwood to the Gazette.142 By discussing the
Hazelwood analysis and not dismissing it as inapplicable, the inference is that
the court would have applied the Hazelwood standard had the speech been
deemed “school-sponsored.”143
harassment, and was actually disruptive to the school’s pedagogical mission. Scallet, 911 F.
Supp. at 1020.
138. Id. at 1011 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
139. In addition to student rights cases, many cases have addressed the collision of
college/university professors’ free speech rights with university interests. See, e.g., Vanderhurst
v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908 (10th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the question of
whether Hazelwood applied at the university or college level was unresolved, but nonetheless
applying the Hazelwood analysis to college professor’s classroom speech because both parties
stipulated that it did apply). See also Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991). In
Bishop, the court held that a university professor’s First Amendment rights were not violated by a
school official’s memo that restricted his rights to talk about religious beliefs or preferences
during class, and prevented him from conducting optional classes to discuss religion. Id. at 107577. To make this determination, the court noted, “insofar as [the Hazelwood standard] covers the
extent to which an institution may limit in-school expressions which suggest the school’s
approval, we adopt the Court’s reasoning as suitable to our ends, even at the university level.” Id.
at 1074. Thus the court adopted the Hazelwood analysis, albeit in a modified form. See id. at
1074-75 (discussing the three considerations that the court would balance). The court specifically
noted that it would give more weight to the professor’s rights than they “concluded [was] proper
under Kuhlmeier.” Id. at 1072 n.5. See also Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1010 n.11 (discussing the
Bishop court’s unique balancing test at length).
140. 732 F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
141. Id. at 1412.
142. Id. at 1414-15.
143. There have been many other cases that have addressed the collision of college/university
students’ free speech rights with university interests where this inference holds true. See, e.g.,
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing Hazelwood at
length, but concluding that the Tinker analysis would apply because the school’s anti-harassment
policy “cover[ed] far more than just the Hazelwood-type school-sponsored speech.”). Cf.
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Beyond Hazelwood

The Supreme Court and lower courts also have recognized differences in
the primary/secondary and undergraduate/graduate educational settings outside
of the context of First Amendment free speech cases. For example, in
Benefield v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama,144 a female
student alleged that the college she attended was liable under Title IX for
failing to prevent her from engaging in sexual activity on campus, which
negatively impacted her class work.145 However, the court refused to find the
school liable, reasoning:
[R]egardless of their age, a college does not have the same obligation to its
students as does a high school. Even though a 15, 16 or 17 year old may be
found at either institution, the institutions have uniquely different obligations
to their students, regardless of the overlap in ages.146
....
[T]he authoritarian role of today’s college administrators has been notably
diluted in recent decades. Trustees, administrators, and faculties have been
required to yield to the expanding rights and privileges of their students . . . .
College students today are no longer minors; they are now regarded as adults
in almost every phase of community life.147

Distinctions based on students’ educational levels are also prevalent in the
arena of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.148 For example, one court noted
the following:
There is a large body of limited open public forum/Establishment Clause
case law in the context of university students. The cases find that in the
context of university students, permitting religious speech and meetings on a

Marianello v. Bushby, No. CIV.A.1:95CV167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996)
(where the court made no mention of Hazelwood, but applied Settle to the graduate student’s
criticism and commentary of his professors during the appeals process for an unfavorable grade
he received).
144. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
145. Id. at 1217. The student was able to attend the university based on a scholarship she
received. Id. at 1213. She lived on campus, and on several occasions, after consuming alcohol,
was sexually exploited by football and basketball players. Id. at 1213-14. As a result of her
activities on campus, her GPA was very low and she eventually had to be placed in a drug
rehabilitation center for adolescents. Id. at 1215. Moreover, the student denied any participation
in the sexual encounters. Benefield, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
146. Id. at 1223 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1223-24 (quoting Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979)) (alteration
in original).
148. E.g., Chris Brown, Note, Good News? Supreme Court Overlooks the Impressionability
of Elementary-Aged Students in Finding a Parental Permission Slip Sufficient to Avoid an
Establishment Clause Violation, Good News Club v. Milford Central, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV.
269, 283-86 (2001).
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university campus would confer no imprimatur of state approval of religious
practices because of the nature of university students (i.e. mature and less
impressionable). However, other cases have distinguished the university
setting from that of a high school, finding that a high school presents
“heightened dangers in the context of the Establishment Clause.”
Unlike a university, where it is generally understood that a student is, with
reason, responsible for the conduct of his or her own affairs, the behavior of a
high school student is subject to the constant regulation and affirmative
supervision of adult school authorities.149

Finally, in Carboni v. Meldrum,150 the court talked about such a distinction
in the context of the Fourth Amendment.151 In Carboni, a graduate student
was stripped searched because school officials suspected her of going to the
restroom during a test, looking at hidden notes, and concealing them on her
person when she was caught.152 In analyzing whether the school’s actions
violated the graduate student’s rights, the court stated:
[A] body search of a graduate student in her late twenties undertaken at the
direction of a university professor and Dean is arguably different from the
same search performed on a fourteen (14) year old high school freshman by a
Vice-Principal. Though higher education administrators must be allowed to
make discretionary decisions, university officials simply do not exercise the
same level of disciplinary control over their students as do public school
teachers and principals.153

Thus, the distinction referenced to by the Supreme Court in past cases such
as Southworth and recognized by many lower courts permeates more than just
First Amendment free speech jurisprudence.

149. Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, No. 90-C6604, 1991 WL 2458, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1991) (citations omitted). See also Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of
Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 260 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[P]ublic secondary and elementary school
administrators are granted more leeway than public colleges and universities or legislative bodies,
e.g., municipalities, states, and Congress.”).
150. 949 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Va. 1996).
151. Id. at 434-35.
152. Id. at 430-31.
153. Id. at 434 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Ultimately, the court did not find a
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
because school administrators, based on the overwhelming evidence, “could have reasonably
concluded they were entitled to do [the search] under the circumstances” and because the scope
was limited. Id. at 435-36.
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III. BROWN V. LI: A DETRIMENTAL DISACKNOWLEDGMENT
A.

Facts of Brown v. Li

The controversy in Brown v. Li centered around a “Disacknowledgments”
section that Christopher Brown, a master’s degree candidate in the Department
of Material Sciences at the University of California, at Santa Barbara, included
with his thesis.154 Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” section expressed the
opposite sentiment that one might expect to see in the acknowledgment section
of a thesis. Instead of praising those who aided him in the completion of his
thesis and supported him throughout the process, Brown began his
“Disacknowledgments” section in the following manner: “I would like to offer
special Fuck You’s to the following degenerates for of [sic] being an everpresent hindrance during my graduate career.”155 Brown then proceeded to
name “the Dean and staff of the UCSB graduate school, the managers of [the
school’s] [l]ibrary, former California Governor Wilson, the Regents of the
University of California, and ‘Science’ as having been particularly obstructive
to [his] progress toward his graduate degree.”156
Brown felt that he had the freedom to include such a section in the opening
of his thesis because of the wording of the University’s “Guide to Filing
Theses and Dissertations.”157 In addition to setting guidelines for the content
and structure of the actual thesis,158 the Guide said the following about an
154. Brown v. Li, 299 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 308 F.3d 939, 941-43 (9th Cir.
2002). The original decision in Brown was released on August 12, 2002, but it was amended and
superceded in October 2002. In addition to bringing claims under the federal constitution, Brown
also alleged violations of his rights under the California constitution. Id. at 946. In its original
decision, the district court did not indicate whether it considered and dismissed the state law
claim or whether its decision was based solely on Brown’s federal claims. Id. at 955. The Ninth
Circuit, in its August decision, did not address this claim either. As a result, the Ninth Circuit
amended its decision in October, noting the vagueness in the district court’s opinion, and thus
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the state law claims. Id. Brown filed a
petition for grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Cert. denied, Brown v.
Li, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003).
155. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 942, 952.
158. Id. at 942. This portion of the Guide seemed to be aimed only at the actual thesis itself,
and not at the content of the optional “Acknowledgments” section. The Guide noted that “‘Each
discipline has a relatively standard method of presenting research results so that other researchers
can find and build on past work.” Id. (emphasis added). An “Acknowledgment” or
“Disacknowledgment” section arguably has nothing to do with future researchers being able to
build upon the student’s work. The court, however, went on to note that “[w]ith respect to the
content of a thesis or dissertation, the Guide states: ‘You and your committee are responsible for
everything between the margins. The organization, presentation, and documentation of your
research should meet the standards for publishing journal articles or monographs in your
field . . . .’” Brown, 308 F.3d at 942. By emphasizing “and your committee,” the court seemed to
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optional “Dedication and/or Acknowledgments” section of a student thesis:
“‘You may wish to dedicate this work to someone special to you or to
acknowledge particular persons who helped you. Within the usual margin
restrictions, any format is acceptable for these pages.”159 Brown understood
this to mean that the student had complete discretion in determining the
contents of this optional section—”that the student ‘may’ dedicate the thesis to
someone special or give thanks to the helpful individuals in the section, or the
student ‘may’ use the section to communicate some other message.”160
In the spring of 1999, Brown submitted his thesis, entitled “The
Morphology of Calcium Carbonate: Factors Affecting Crystal Shape,” to his
three-member Committee.161 This version of his thesis did not include the
controversial “Disacknowledgments” section.162 In fact, Brown specifically
did not submit his “Disacknowledgments” to the members of the thesis
committee because “he feared that they would not approve [the section].”163
suggest that the committee should retain control over the entire thesis including the
“Acknowledgements” section. However, a more accurate reading of this section of the Guide
suggests it is aimed at the presentation of the candidate’s research, rather than the candidate’s
optional Acknowledgments. Guidelines for Acknowledgements is in a separate section of the
Guide, and seems to rely upon considerations independent from those directed at the candidate’s
research. Id. at 942. Thus, the section should not be read to regulate the “Acknowledgements
section,” or, as in Brown’s case, his “Disacknowledgments.” Contrary to what the court suggests,
the section of the guide that speaks to committee oversight does not automatically mandate the
conclusion that Brown had no freedom of speech and that the committee retained control over the
optional “Acknowledgments” section.
159. Id. (emphasis added). The court also cited a passage from a style manual that was
referred to in a different portion of the Guide—not in the “Acknowledgment” guidelines section.
Id. According to this style manual, “‘In the acknowledgments, the writer thanks mentors and
colleagues, lists the individuals or institutions that supported the research, and gives credit to
works cited in the text for which permission to reproduce has been granted.’” Id. (citing KATE L.
TURABIAN, A MANUAL FOR WRITERS OF TERM PAPERS, THESES, AND DISSERTATIONS §§ 1.9,
1.26 (6th ed. 1996)). However, the court’s reliance on the Turabian manual is misplaced. First,
in many other instances, the University did not follow such a guideline. Brown, 308 F.3d at 946.
For instance, some students thanked “God” or their “pets.” Id. Another student made reference
to, inter alia, “the dips**ts who decided to put the P chemists on the forth [sic] floor” and “the
dumb ass who left his cooling water ON . . . and subsequently flooded my lab, desk, and my most
important files: may your bloated, limb-less bodies wash to shore and be picked clean by seabirds
and maggots . . . .” Id. at 967 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). All of these
student’s “Acknowledgements” sections were approved, although the Turabian manual would
seem to dictate a contrary result. Id. at 943. Moreover, even if the Turabian manual’s definition
of the “Acknowledgments” section was authoritative, it constitutes impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
160. Brown, 308 F.3d at 952-53. Again, even if this view was rejected, the limitation of the
“Acknowledgements” section based on the speaker’s viewpoint could still be declared
unconstitutional. See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
161. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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After obtaining approval of his thesis from the thesis committee, Brown
inserted the “Disacknowledgments” section, and attempted to file his thesis
with the library. However, the library noticed the added section and contacted
the Dean of the Graduate Division of the School, Dean Li, who withheld
Brown’s degree and referred the matter to Brown’s thesis committee.164
Brown then drafted an alternative “Disacknowledgments” section, which
omitted the profanity used in the original draft, but the thesis committee still
refused to approve his thesis.165 In a memorandum of its decision, the
committee noted that Brown’s section “did not meet professional standards for
publication in the field,”166 and concluded that “the addition or removal of
material from a dissertation after the examination, evaluation and signed
approval of the original materials . . . is unacceptable . . . .”167 Dean Li also
wrote Brown notifying him that his thesis would be approved as soon as he
removed the “Disacknowledgments” section.168
Instead of complying with Dean Li’s ultimatum, however, Brown appealed
to the Academic Affairs Committee of the Department of Material Sciences.
The Committee denied Brown’s appeal, reasoning “that the entire paper, not
merely the technical content of the thesis, was subject to the review and
approval of the thesis committee,”169 and that the thesis committee members
had the “right[] . . . not to be associated, through their approval, with the
content of the ‘Disacknowledgments’ section.”170 Brown’s appeals to the
Associate Dean of the Graduate Division, the University’s Graduate Council,
and the Academic Freedom Committee were likewise unsuccessful.171 In
January 2000, Brown’s degree was withheld, and he was put on academic
probation.172
164. Id. at 943. Filing the thesis with the library was a prerequisite to earning a degree. Id.
165. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 944. In its memo, the thesis committee also “determined”—with recommendation
from counsel—that the manuscript was not a “public forum.” Id.
168. Id.
169. Brown, 308 F.3d at 944. The Academic Affairs Committee went on to state that “An
Acknowledgement section in a scientific paper is relevant only as a vehicle for the author to give
proper credit to people or organizations that have contributed to make possible the technical work
being reported . . . [and] the student is given a certain latitude in a thesis to thank his/her parents,
spouse, family or close friends . . . .” Id. Again, however, this reasoning is inconsistent with the
action of the University on other occasions; nowhere does this definition allow for praise of pets
or criticism of faculty, administration, or staff. See supra note 159.
170. Brown, 308 F.3d at 944-45. However, this argument is subject to much criticism. See
infra Part IV.A.2.a.
171. Brown, 308 F.3d at 945. These individuals/panels basically reiterated the arguments
made by the Academic Affairs Committee. See supra text accompanying notes 1665-67. The
Academic Freedom Council’s decision rested mainly on the reasoning that Brown had “failed to
follow [the] rules.” Brown, 308 F.3d at 945.
172. Id.
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In the meantime, the media caught wind of the brewing controversy, and
on May 11, 2000, a producer for “ABC’s Nightly News with Peter Jennings”
contacted Brown.173 On May 14, University officials spoke with the
producer.174 On May 15, Brown was interviewed.175 On May 16, Brown
received a letter from Federal Express—the University had decided to award
his degree, even though the “Disacknowledgments” section had not been
removed from the thesis.176 However, at the time Brown filed suit, he had not
provided the library with an approved version of the thesis without the
“Disacknowledgments,” so his thesis was not displayed in the library
according to UCSB’s usual custom.177
In June of 2000, Brown filed a section 1983 action in the Ninth Circuit
alleging, inter alia, “that [the Dean of the University’s Graduate Division, the
Chancellor of the University, the members of his thesis committee, and the
Director of the University’s library] violated his First Amendment rights by
‘withholding’ his degree by their ‘conduct.’”178

173. Id. at 966 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Brown, 308 F.3d at 966. The University contended that “the timing was a coincidence.”
Id.
177. Id. at 945.
178. Id. Brown also claimed that the defendants violated his procedural due process rights by
failing to give him a formal hearing and that their actions in mandating that he remove the
“Disacknowledgments” section violated the California state constitution. Id. at 945-46. A
majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on the procedural due process claim. Brown, 308 F.3d at 955, 956. At the time of the
writing of this Note, the court of appeals had remanded the state law claims for consideration by
the district court, because the district court was silent as to the state law claims. Id. at 955. This
Note will only analyze the First Amendment claim.
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Judge Graber’s Denial of Disacknowledgments: No Viable First
Amendment Claim179

Reviewing the district court’s summary judgment for the school de novo,
Judge Graber began by laying out the standard for determining whether the
University officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the First
Amendment claim.180 Judge Graber then addressed the merits of Brown’s
argument that the defendant’s decision to refuse to approve the
“Disacknowledgments” section “demonstrate[d] a violation of his clearly
established First Amendment rights.”181 Recognizing that there was “no
precedent precisely on point,” Judge Graber then analyzed the threshold legal
question: does the deferential Hazelwood standard apply in the post-secondary
setting?182
1.

Hazelwood is the Most Analogous Case to Brown

Ultimately, Judge Graber concluded that Hazelwood did apply, reasoning
that it properly “balances a university’s interest in academic freedom and a
student’s First Amendment rights.”183 She first analyzed the Hazelwood
decision itself to reach this conclusion.184 After summarizing the holding of
the case, Judge Graber focused on the language from Hazelwood that led the
Court to determine that the school newspaper was part of the curriculum and
179. Note that the decision in Brown is a plurality decision. Id. at 956-57. Justices Graber
and Ferguson both concluded that Brown’s First Amendment rights were not violated, but applied
differing legal standards. Id. at 957. This Note will not focus on Judge Ferguson’s concurrence.
Judge Ferguson summarized the situation as follows: “ . . . the guy cooked the books, (his
master’s thesis), got caught, and now wants to shield his misbehavior under the umbrella of the
First Amendment.” Id. at 955 (Ferguson, J., concurring). Instead of addressing the issue of
whether Hazelwood applied to Brown’s case, Judge Ferguson characterized the case as one of
deception, focusing on Brown’s “dishonest addition of the ‘Disacknowledgments,’” and
concluded that Brown could not “cheat and then seek to evade accountability through the First
Amendment.” Brown, 308 F.3d at 955. As the dissent aptly noted, however, “the record . . . [did]
not support this conclusion. The university’s offer to afford Brown all of the same benefits that
he would have received before he ‘cheated’ if he would simply remove the offending material
from his thesis belies the argument that the sanctions were imposed to punish him for cheating.”
Id. at 965 n.7 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 946-47. In particular, Judge Graber noted that the court would have to apply a
three-part test: (1) whether “the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right”, (2) whether
the right “was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation”; and (3) “whether an
objectively reasonable government actor would have known that his or her conduct violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional right.” Id. (citing Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1012-13
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
181. Id. at 947.
182. Brown, 308 F.3d at 947.
183. Id. at 952.
184. Id. at 947-48.
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not a public forum.185 Judge Graber noted that the Court so concluded because
the newspaper was “‘supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences;’”186 thus,
school officials could regulate student speech provided it was “‘reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”187
Before discussing the specific applicability of Hazelwood, the court
analogized Brown’s case to Settle v. Dickson, where the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied Hazelwood.188 In Settle, a ninth-grade student received
approval for her paper topic, changed topics without the knowledge of the
teacher, and then claimed her First Amendment rights were violated when she
received no credit for the paper.189 Reciting the deferential standard once
more, Judge Graber concluded that “Hazelwood and Settle lead to the
conclusion that an educator can, consistent with the First Amendment, require
that a student comply with the terms of an academic assignment,”190
notwithstanding the fact that both cases involved student speech at the precollegiate level.
Curiously, however, Judge Graber did not address the underlying policy
reasons for applying Hazelwood in the post-secondary setting. Noting a lack
of Supreme Court guidance on the issue, Judge Graber took the position that
Hazelwood, even if it was not the correct standard to apply, was the best.191
2.

Curricular Versus Extra-curricular Expressive Activities.

Providing support for her argument, Judge Graber reasoned that the postcollegiate cases in the First and Sixth Circuits that had distinguished
Hazelwood and held that the deferential standard did not apply at the collegiate
level were themselves distinguishable from Brown.192 Because those cases
involved extracurricular activities, and Brown involved curriculum-related

185. Id. at 947-48.
186. Id. at 947 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
187. Brown, 308 F.3d at 949 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 273).
188. Id. at 948. For a more in-depth discussion of Settle, see supra text accompanying notes
103-108.
189. Id. at 948 (citing Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 154-55 (6th Cir.
1995)).
190. Id. at 949.
191. Id. at 951. Judge Graber noted the following:
We do not know with certainty that the Supreme Court would hold that Hazelwood
controls the inquiry into whether a university’s requirements for and an evaluation of a
student’s curricular speech infringe that student’s First Amendment rights. Nevertheless,
of all the Supreme Court’s cases, Hazelwood appears to be the most analogous to the
present case.
Brown, 308 F.3d at 951.
192. Id. at 949 (citing Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Student
Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1989)).
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student speech, Kincaid and Student Government Association were not
controlling.193
The Supreme Court, noted Judge Graber, never articulated the appropriate
standard for reviewing a university’s regulation of post-secondary student
speech that is related to a school’s curriculum; thus, it remained an open
question whether Hazelwood applied.194 Judge Graber argued that a review of
Supreme Court precedent showed that the Court upheld the curricularextracurricular distinction in other contexts, indicating that the Court might
continue to do so if confronting a free speech case in the university setting.195
The precedents showed, argued Judge Graber, that “the curriculum of a public
educational institution is one means by which the institution itself expresses its
policy, a policy with which others do not have a constitutional right to
interfere.”196 Judge Graber expanded her argument by citing to academic
freedom cases. In addition, Judge Graber argued that a university’s control of
its curriculum may in fact be even broader than a primary or secondary
school’s regulation of its curriculum, for “arguably the need for academic
discipline and editorial rigor increases as a student’s learning progresses.”197
3.

Application of Hazelwood to Brown

Finally, Judge Graber applied the Hazelwood standard to the facts in
Brown and concluded, without any analysis, that Brown’s thesis, co-signed by
members of the thesis committee, was not a public forum.198 Moreover, the
“Acknowledgments” section was curricular “because it was designed to teach
Plaintiff how to research within an academic specialty and how to present his

193. Id. at 949.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 950-51 (citing Bd. of Educ. Of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002) (“distinguishing between core educational functions and voluntary extracurricular
activities for Fourth Amendment purposes”); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 673-74 (1998) (“‘Much like a university selecting a commencement speaker, a public
institution selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public school prescribing its curriculum, a
broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of others.’”)
(emphasis added); Bd. of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
862 (1982) (plurality refused to extend holding to curricular speech, noting “‘the only books at
issue in this case are library books, books that by their nature are optional rather than required
reading. Our adjudication of the present case thus does not intrude into the classroom, or into the
compulsory courses taught there.’”)).
196. Brown, 308 F.3d at 951.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 954. In fact, it seems that Judge Graber was not even sure that the thesis was the
proper thing to use for the forum analysis. Id. at 954 n.5 (noting that “[t]he dissent posits that a
‘public forum’ analysis might provide an appropriate standard for this case. However, the dissent
does not identify what, precisely, could constitute a public forum in this case.”) (citations
omitted).
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results to other scholars in his field.”199 Judge Graber also rejected Brown’s
reading of the Guide,200 concluding that Hazelwood did not require viewpoint
neutrality, and thus “a teacher may require a student to write a paper from a
particular viewpoint, even if it is a viewpoint with which the student disagrees,
so long as the requirement serves a legitimate pedagogical purpose.”201
According to Judge Graber, in Brown, the University’s legitimate pedagogical
purpose was teaching Brown “the proper format for a scientific paper.”202
With little discussion, Judge Graber also recognized that the committee
members had a competing First Amendment right not to approve the thesis.203
Finally, she concluded that even though other acknowledgement sections were
“nonconforming,”204 no genuine issue of material fact existed because one
thesis committee’s derelict adherence to the written academic standards
“simply ha[d] no bearing on whether his thesis committee had a legitimate
pedagogical purpose.”205 Even though this would admittedly result in a lack of
uniformity, Judge Graber suggested that each committee could set its own
academic standards without implicating First Amendment concerns.206
C. Dissent’s Disagreement: Majority Disacknowledged First Amendment
Implications207
Judge Stephen Reinhardt began his analysis by putting the First
Amendment issue in perspective, anticipating the reaction some might have to
the case. “Although the underlying dispute may appear to some to be trivial,
199. Id. at 952.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 157-160 for a discussion of Brown’s argument.
201. Brown, 308 F.3d at 953.
202. Id. at 952. Judge Graber argued that the university was trying to teach Brown how to
conform to professional norms. Id. at 953.
203. Id. at 952 (citing Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828-30 (6th Cir. 1989) (Parate held
“that a university professor has a First Amendment right to assign grades and evaluate students as
determined by his or her independent professional judgment.”)) Judge Graber thought the
academic freedom interest was even more compelling in Brown than in Parate since the
committee member’s names would be included in the thesis, suggesting that they were
responsible for the entire content of the thesis—acknowledgement and all. Brown, 308 F.3d at
952.
204. Id. at 953. For examples of other nonconforming “Acknowledgments” section, see
supra note 158.
205. Id. at 953.
206. Id. at 953-54 (noting that “this thesis committee was entitled to set an academic standard
for Plaintiff’s thesis, including its acknowledgments section, even if no thesis committee in the
past had ever set one.”).
207. Note that Judge Reinhardt, in addition to dissenting, concurred in part. Id. at 956
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt agreed with Judge Graber and Judge Ferguson that
the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Brown’s procedural due process claim
should be affirmed and that the case should be sent back to the district court to address the
California state law claims. Brown, 308 F.3d at 956.
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and perhaps not worthy of serious First Amendment deliberation, the extreme
positions taken by the parties during the course of their disagreement and the
erroneous legal rule advocated by [Judge Graber] leaves me with little choice
but to discuss the constitutional questions in some depth.”208 Judge Reinhardt
criticized the plurality for refusing to confront or discuss the First Amendment
issues implicated in the case.209 Next, Judge Reinhardt presented his
arguments: (1) Hazelwood was the erroneous legal standard; (2) a different
legal standard or standards should be applied in the university setting; and (3)
even assuming Hazelwood applied in the post-secondary setting, the facts on
record presented genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary
judgment.210
1.

Hazelwood is Inapplicable in the Post-secondary Setting

Judge Reinhardt “vehemently disagree[ed]” with Judge Graber that
Hazelwood should apply in the post-secondary setting.211 In reaching his
conclusion, Judge Reinhardt considered underlying policy rationales and
examined past precedent.
First, Judge Reinhardt argued that differences between primary/secondary
and post-secondary students warranted the inapplicability of Hazelwood.212
High school students, Judge Reinhardt argued, are less emotionally mature
than college and graduate students.213 Moreover, Judge Reinhardt argued,
without giving examples, that the application of Hazelwood to universities and
graduate schools would “seriously undermine the rights” of such students.214
In addition, post-secondary students are typically more independent, and most
enjoy greater legal freedoms than high school students, including, but not
limited to, being able to purchase cigarettes, to marry, to the join the military,
to vote, and to legally consume alcohol.215 In fact, Hazelwood itself suggested
that such a distinction might be upheld.216
Second, Judge Reinhardt argued that legal precedent showed that postsecondary students should be afforded more First Amendment protections. He
pointed out that many of the cases that Judge Graber relied on in her analysis

208. Id.
209. Id. at 959.
210. Id. at 957-58.
211. Id. at 960 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
212. Brown, 308 F.3d at 957.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 957.
215. Id. at 961. Of course, some high school students may also have such rights, as Judge
Reinhardt readily acknowledges. Id. However, a majority of students do not have such rights
until reaching college.
216. Brown, 308 F.3d at 956 (Reihnardt, J. dissenting) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988)).
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included language that suggested Hazelwood was limited to primary and
secondary student speech.217 Judge Reinhardt also cited cases that explicitly
recognized that college and graduate students are less impressionable than
primary and secondary students,218 cases that suggested primary and secondary
students were subject to more discipline,219 and cases that stood for the
proposition that post-secondary students should receive the same protection as
adults outside of the educational setting.220
Most importantly, Judge Reinhardt criticized Judge Graber for incorrectly
importing the curricular-extracurricular distinction into the realm of
Hazelwood.221 Judge Graber’s distinction, stated Judge Reinhardt, was
“disingenuous at best.”222 In fact, Judge Reinhardt argued, the language of
Hazelwood suggested that the deferential standard could be applied to both
curricular and extracurricular activities.223 Accordingly, because the Kincaid
case dealt with a student publication under faculty and university management,

217. Id. at 961 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southern Nev., Inc., v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist.,
941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“discussing the immaturity of a high school
audience and stating that the First Amendment standard applicable to high school student speech
must provide educators with ‘the ability to consider the emotional maturity of the intended
audience’”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (“‘[A] school must be
able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience’”) (alteration in
original); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1986) (“emphasizing that
one reason why high school officials should be accorded more deference to limit student speech is
because a high school audience is ‘less mature’”)).
218. Id. at 961 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
835 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
688 (1971)).
219. Id. at 961-62 (“The activities of high school students . . . may be more stringently
reviewed than the conduct of college students, as the former are in a much more adolescent and
immature stage of life.”) (citing Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d
858, 863 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982); Id. at 962 (noting that “‘A college relies in large measure on faculty
self-governance and its contributions to administrative decisions. This is analogous to, but
different from a high school’s need to discipline by . . . superiors.’”) (quoting Mabey v. Reagan,
537 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1976)).
220. Brown, 308 F.3d at 962 (“emphasizing that ‘the right of teaching institutions to limit
expressive freedom of students ha[s] been confined to high schools’”) (citing Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 n.4 (2000) (alterations in original);
(“‘[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged
need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses
than in the community at large.’”) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
221. Id. at 962-63 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 963.
223. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)) (“‘[S]choolsponsored publications [and] theatrical productions’” that are ‘supervised by faculty members . . .
are examples of expressive activities that ‘bear the imprimatur of the school’ and are therefore
subject to the same degree of First Amendment scrutiny as curricular speech, even if they do not
‘occur in a traditional classroom setting.’”)).
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the language of Hazelwood arguably should have dictated a different result,
contrary to Judge Graber’s analysis.224
Ultimately, Judge Reinhardt concluded, “the reasons underlying the
deference with respect to the regulation of the speech rights of high school
youths do not apply in the adult world of college and graduate students, an
arena in which academic freedom and vigorous debate are supposed to
flourish . . . .”225
2.

Proposed Applicable Legal Standards226

Although Judge Reinhardt did not provide an in-depth explanation of how
current standards would be applied in student free speech cases, he proposed
two alternative legal standards that could be applied in the post-secondary
setting—standards that he thought would provide more protection for college
and graduate students than Hazelwood, but that also would accommodate the
university’s interest in furthering pedagogical purposes.227
First, Judge Reinhardt argued that student speech in the post-secondary
setting could be governed by the limited public forum doctrine.228 Under this
doctrine, schools could impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
on speech, but could not make restrictions on the basis of viewpoint, and could
only discriminate on the basis of content if school officials could show that the
restriction at issue was narrowly drawn to accommodate some compelling
interest.229 Second, Judge Reinhardt suggested that courts could apply an
intermediate level of scrutiny to school regulations of college and graduate
student speech, like the standard applied to the quasi-suspect gender class in
equal protection claims.230

224. Id.
225. Brown, 308 F.3d at 957.
226. The viability and intelligibility of these proposed standards will be considered infra at
Part IV.B.
227. Brown, 308 F.3d at 963-64 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Although he only mentioned two
possible standards, Judge Reinhardt did not think that they were the only possibilities. Id.
Whatever standard ultimately applies, Judge Reinhardt cautioned that “it is important to
distinguish student speech from university speech, teacher or other employee speech, and the
speech of private individuals using the university’s facilities . . . . [For] [i]t may be that different
First Amendment standards are applicable in different contexts to restrictions imposed at the
university level . . . .” Id. at 964.
228. Id. at 964.
229. Id.
230. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964. If such a standard were applicable to the university setting, “the
university would have the burden of demonstrating that its regulation of college and graduate
speech was substantially related to an important pedagogical purpose.” Id. (emphasis added).
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Genuine Issues of Material Fact Existed that Precluded Summary
Judgment

Even assuming Hazelwood applied, Judge Reinhardt still thought that the
Brown case was improperly disposed of on summary judgment.231 Judge
Reinhardt classified Brown as a case of excessive punishment.232 He argued
that the actions taken by the university—withholding Brown’s degree for
almost a year, and placing him on academic probation, making him ineligible
for a university teaching or research position or financial aid—were grossly
disproportionate in comparison to the alleged violation.233
In Judge Reinhardt’s eyes, if Hazelwood applied, the ultimate resolution of
the case would turn on the motivation of the defendant.234 And, as Judge
Reinhardt argued, the facts of the case suggested the possibility of two
competing possible motivations—the university may have punished Brown for
his noncompliance with the “proper format for a scientific paper,” or the
university may have punished him for his “hostile” and “castigating” views
regarding university officials.235 As such, Judge Reinhardt concluded that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the university’s
purported reasons for disciplining Brown were reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical purpose or were pretextual, an issue that could not
properly be decided by the court on a summary judgment motion.236 Thus, he
would have, at the least, reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the First Amendment claims.237

231. Id. at 965.
232. Id. at 960 n.4 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt, piercing the veil of the
defendants’ argument, noted, “this case is about much more than the mere decision not to approve
the disacknowledgments or the ensuing decision not to permit the placement of the thesis in the
library.” Id. at 960.
233. Brown, 308 F.3d at 965.
234. Id. at 960.
235. Id. at 966, 967.
236. Id. at 967. Judge Reinhardt argued that the possibility of pretext was strengthened by the
fact that the University decided to confer the degree immediately after the media contacted the
University and Brown. Id. at 966. In addition, the pretext argument was strengthened by the fact
that the University had not disciplined a student who wrote the following acknowledgement:
To: 1) the dips**ts who decided to put the P-chemists on the forth [sic] floor, 2) the inept
facilities management monkey who raised the cooling water pressure and 3) the dumb ass
who left his cooling water ON for a laser that was OFF for 2 years and subsequently
flooded my lab, desk, and my most important files: may your bloated, limb-less bodies
wash to shore and be picked clean by seabirds and maggots . . . .
Brown, 308 F.3d at 967.
237. Id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Majority Misses the Point

Judge Graber’s analysis failed to adequately safeguard the free speech
rights of post-secondary students. Instead of squarely confronting the
unresolved First Amendment issues in-depth, many of her arguments were
conclusory and lacked support. Most troubling, her opinion was plagued by a
lack of underlying policy considerations—considerations indispensable to
answering the threshold legal question of whether Hazelwood should apply in
the university setting. Specifically, Judge Graber’s analysis was erroneous for
the following reasons: (1) Hazelwood should not apply in the post-secondary
setting; (2) even if Hazelwood was the correct legal standard to apply, Judge
Graber’s application of the deferential Hazelwood standard to the facts of
Brown was incomplete; and (3) at the least, Brown raised genuine issues of
material fact that precluded summary judgment.
1.

Hazelwood is Inapplicable in the Post-Secondary Setting238

Lacking precedent, Judge Graber concluded that Hazelwood was the
applicable legal standard in some situations when confronting post-secondary
student free speech claims:
We do not know with certainty that the Supreme Court would hold that
Hazelwood controls the inquiry into whether a university’s requirements for
and evaluation of a student’s curricular speech infringe that student’s First
Amendment rights.
Nevertheless, of all the Supreme Court’s cases,
Hazelwood appears to be the most analogous to the present case.239

By so noting, Judge Graber amplified the weakness of her arguments. In fact,
this weakness was also underscored by the arbitrariness of the distinction she
drew to distinguish Brown from other circuits that addressed the applicability
of Hazelwood and because her analysis was not supported by policy reasons.
a.

Curricular versus Extracurricular: An Arbitrary Distinction

The major premise underlying Judge Graber’s argument—the argument
that allows her to apply Hazelwood to the university setting—was that
Hazelwood applies in the post-secondary setting to curricular activities, but not
to extracurricular activities.240 By drawing this distinction, Judge Graber
attempted to distinguish Kincaid and Student Government Association, thus
238. This begs the question of what standard should apply in the post-secondary setting if
Hazelwood does not. Possible legal standards will be proffered and critiqued. See infra Part
IV.B.
239. Brown, 308 F.3d at 951.
240. See supra Part III.B.2 (examining in more detail the distinction that Judge Graber
draws).
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reaching the opposite conclusion of other circuits.241 However, this distinction,
at least in the Hazelwood arena of law, is unsupported by the caselaw.
First, the distinction is unsupported by the Hazelwood decision itself. As
Judge Reinhardt aptly pointed out in his dissent, the Hazelwood court, albeit in
dicta, suggested that there was no per se bar to the applicability of the
deferential Hazelwood standard to extracurricular activities:
“School-sponsored publications [and] theatrical productions” . . . that are
“supervised by faculty members” . . . are examples of expressive activities that
“bear the imprimatur of the school” and are therefore subject to the same
degree of First Amendment scrutiny as curricular speech, even if they do not
“occur in a traditional classroom setting.”242

The examples listed by the Hazelwood Court can be fairly characterized as
extracurricular—an implication reinforced by the Court’s explanation that such
activities do not occur in the traditional classroom setting. In addition,
although the particular facts of the case involved an activity that the Court
characterized as “part of the educational curriculum and a ‘regular classroom
activit[y],’”243 the Court’s holding referred only to “school-sponsored”
activities, with no further limitation.244 Even if this is a misreading of the
Hazelwood decision and this was not the intent of the Hazelwood Court, lower
courts, in interpreting the Hazelwood decision, have held that this is a fair, if
not correct, reading of Hazelwood. For example, in 2002, the Tenth Circuit, in
interpreting the applicability of Hazelwood to a tile-painting project at
Columbine High School in Colorado, held the following:
[T]he district court read Hazelwood as only applying “to activities conducted
as part of the school curriculum.” . . . We believe this reading of Hazelwood is
too narrow. We read the Court’s definition of “school-sponsored” speech to
mean activities that might reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of
the school and that involve pedagogical concerns.245

241. For a more in-depth discussion of these decisions, see supra text accompanying notes
122-28.
242. Brown, 308 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
243. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268.
244. Id. at 273.
245. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 924 (10th Cir. 2002). The court
concluded that the project was school-sponsored speech, even though “the painting activity took
place outside of school hours and was not mandatory,” and even despite a school official who had
explicitly stated, “‘this is a project outside of the school, this is a separate project . . . .’” Id. at
930. For a more in-depth discussion of Fleming, see supra notes 109-111 and accompanying
text. Judge Reinhardt, in his dissent, provided an example of school-sponsored speech that takes
place outside of school hours and is not mandatory from the Ninth Circuit. Brown, 308 F.3d at
963 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (“interpreting the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision and
holding that ‘the Court intended that the same principles that animate educational decisions . . .
come into play when determining what advertisements are suitable for publication in school
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Thus, although the Supreme Court has noted a curricular-extracurricular
distinction in non-Hazelwood cases,246 the Supreme Court arguably did not
uphold this distinction in Hazelwood.
Contrary to Judge Graber’s conclusion, more prevalent in the rhetoric of
lower court cases applying Hazelwood are distinctions based not on the
supposed curricular-extracurricular dichotomy, but instead on the differences
between primary and secondary students as opposed to college and graduate
students. In fact, this is a distinction that courts and individual judges
recognized even before Hazelwood emerged onto the jurisprudential scene.247
Courts applying Hazelwood in the pre-collegiate setting and courts applying
Hazelwood in the post-secondary setting have recognized such a distinction.248
In addition, the pre-collegiate/post-secondary distinction finds support in other
First Amendment cases outside of the Hazelwood context.249
Most importantly, the Hazelwood decision explicitly noted that such a
distinction might be recognized in student free speech jurisprudence.250
Although the ultimate viability of such a distinction has not been definitively

newspapers, yearbooks and athletic programs.’”) (citing Planned Parenthood of Southern Nev.,
Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, (9th Cir. 1991) (omissions in original).
246. See supra note 195.
247. See, e.g., J.D. Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986) (Hill, J., dissenting). In
that decision, Judge Hill criticized the majority for applying the Fraser standard at the college
level and noted:
The purpose of education through high school is to instill basic knowledge, to lay the
foundations to enable a student to learn greater knowledge, and to teach basic social,
moral, and political values. A college education, on the other hand, deals more with
challenging a student’s ideas and concepts on a given subject matter. The college
atmosphere enables students to rethink their views on various issues in an intellectual
atmosphere which forces students to analyze their basic beliefs. Thus, high school is
necessarily more structured than college, where a more free-wheeling experience is both
contemplated and needed. What might be instructionally unacceptable in high school
might be fully acceptable in college.
Id. at 588. The case of Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D.C. Mass. 1971), also discusses
this distinction at some length:
The secondary school more clearly that the college or university acts in loco parentis with
respect to minors. It is closely governed by a school board selected by a local
community . . . . While secondary schools are not rigid disciplinary institutions, neither
are they open forums in which mature adults, already habituated to social restraints,
exchange ideas on a level of parity.
Id. at 1392.
248. See supra Part II.D.
249. See supra Part II.E.
250. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (“We need not now
decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored
expressive activities at the college and university level.”).
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determined,251 the Supreme Court, in recent student free speech jurisprudence,
seems inclined to uphold the distinction.252 In fact, even before Hazelwood
came onto the jurisprudential scene, the Supreme Court endorsed such a
distinction in decisions such as Healy and Papish.253These Supreme Court and
lower court precedents combine to strongly suggest that, contrary to Judge
Graber’s conclusion, Hazelwood should not apply in the post-secondary
setting.
b.

Deep-Seated Distinctions: Applying Hazelwood is Not Good Policy

Although Judge Reinhardt only briefly discussed the underlying policies
that caution against applying Hazelwood to undergraduate and graduate student
speech,254 similar policy discussions are noticeably absent from Judge Graber’s
analysis. Judge Graber could have, and should have, considered the competing
policy arguments. If she had, she might have come to the proper conclusion
that applying Hazelwood would not make for good policy.
First, one need not look further than the underlying differences between
pre-collegiate and post-secondary students, both in and outside of the
classroom, to see that applying Hazelwood to undergraduate and graduate
students would be detrimental. For example, there is ample psychological data
to support the conclusion that students at the different levels fundamentally
differ.255 Because school officials have to be more concerned with the
impressionability of primary and secondary students, a concern that the
Supreme Court apparently recognized when formulating the deferential
Hazelwood standard, it would be both unfair and illogical to apply the same
standard to college and graduate students.
Moreover, the dynamics of the educational setting in the pre-collegiate and
post-secondary settings differ greatly. The pre-collegiate educational setting

251. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is thus an open question whether
Hazelwood articulates the standard for reviewing a university’s assessment of a student’s
academic work.”).
252. See supra Part II.D.2.a.
253. See supra Part II.C. The Healy Court set out the following standard: “While a college
has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus . . . a ‘heavy burden’ rests on the
college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184
(1972). In Papish, the Court concluded that only reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions
could be imposed on post-secondary student speech, reasoning “that the mere dissemination of
ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university cammpus [sic] may not be
shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’” Papish v. Bd. Of Curators of the Univ.
of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 211-215.
255. See supra note 115.
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has been characterized as one of “cultural transmission.”256 According to this
theory:
The school environment provides “inputs” of information that the
student/machine stores and then “outputs” as behavior. Because the child’s
internal thought processes merely reflect physical and social inputs, cultural
transmissionists see the educational process as a guided acquisition of
knowledge that reinforces desirable responses and eliminates undesirable
ones . . . . [T]he purpose of education is . . . to assure the internalization of
established norms, with the child’s need to learn societal discipline receiving
particular emphasis.257

In contrast to the cultural transmission theory is “progressivism.”258 Unlike
cultural transmission, progressivism “highly values student expression and
independent thought,” and the primary goal of progressive education is to
develop the student’s thought processes.259 Until the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hazelwood, cultural transmission was rejected and progressivism was
advocated in higher education.260 In contrast, before Hazelwood, the precollegiate educational setting was characterized by cultural transmission or
indoctrination.261 With the advent of the deferential Hazelwood standard,
cultural transmission was arguably even more deeply imbedded in free speech
jurisprudence.262 Extending the application of Hazelwood to the free speech
rights of undergraduate and graduate students conflicts with the progressivist
environment that was so entrenched in the post-secondary educational setting.
Second, aside from the more theoretical considerations, there are practical
considerations to address. The introduction of the deferential Hazelwood
standard to student free speech jurisprudence has had a noticeably detrimental
effect at the high school level. For example, within three weeks of the
Hazelwood decision, the Student Press Law Center (“SPLC”) – a non-profit
organization that seeks to protect student media rights – “answered more than
256. William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court’s Ideology,
40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 943 (1987).
257. Id. at 943-44 (citing Lawrence Kohlberg & Rochelle Mayer, Development as the Aim of
Education, 42 HARV. EDUC. REV. 449, 456 (1972)).
258. Id. at 947.
259. Id. at 948.
260. Id. at 952-53.
261. Senhauser, supra note 256, at 952, 962-977. Senhauser does note that for a while, it
seemed as though the Supreme Court was going to, and did indeed, embrace progressivism at the
primary and secondary level with its Tinker decision. Id. at 954-59. However, the cultural
transmission ideology was “revitalized” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Fraser. Id. at 971.
262. Senhauser’s article does not address the effect of the Hazelwood decision, for it was
published before Hazelwood was decided. However, because Hazelwood arguably established an
even more deferential standard than Fraser, it would not at all be a stretch to say that Hazelwood
not only embraced, but also extended the cultural transmission ideology. For a discussion of
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, see supra Part II.A.
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500 calls from students, teachers, and professional journalists about the
implications of the opinion.”263 Even ten years after Hazelwood, the SPLC
was receiving calls on average of “one per day, every day.”264 The Director of
the SPLC, attributing this to Hazelwood, stated, “Hazelwood has essentially
gutted the First Amendment in many of America1s [sic] high schools . . . .”265
Moreover, the Hazelwood analysis has been extended “beyond the realm of
student expression rights” into other areas implicating pre-collegiate students’
concerns.266 Most strikingly, cases that actually rule censorship improper
under the deferential Hazelwood standard are “rare.”267 Based on such
ramifications from the application of Hazelwood at the pre-collegiate level, the
ramifications for college and graduate students would be just as devastating, if
not more. According to its terms, the Hazelwood standard tips the balance in
favor of school officials, giving them much authority and discretion to censor
student speech. In a setting where students are more mature, have more legal
rights, and where the emphasis is on independent thinking instead of
indoctrination, such censorship could ultimately lead to the demise of the
“marketplace of ideas.”268
263. Rosemary C. Salamone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 271 (1992). The SPLC continued to track an increase in
censorship after the Hazelwood decision, reporting that “school officials show[ed] little hesitation
to censor student publications for a variety of arguably ‘pedagogical’ reasons.” Id. at 307. In
addition, “[a]lmost without exception, courts uph[o]ld school officials’ decisions to censor.”
Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free Expression on
Public Campuses, Lessons from the “College Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481, 497
(2001). Moreover, Peltz lists examples of “cases of censorship that never reach[ed] the
courtroom.” Id. at 497-98.
264. Peltz, supra note 263, at 498.
265. Student Press Law Center, High School Censorship Calls Soar in ‘97, 14 REPORT 3 (Fall
1998) (quoting SPLC Executive Director Mark Goodman) (quotation marks omitted), available
at http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=272&edition=10 (last visited February 28, 2003).
For example, “[t]he Hazelwood doctrine in the high schools [has given] principals nearly
unbridled discretion to say what is and what is not appropriate content for student media.” Peltz,
supra note 263, at 533.
266. Peltz, supra note 263, at 499.
267. See, e.g., id. at 505-06 (describing one case as “ground-breaking for its pro-student
conclusion under a purely Hazelwood analysis.”). Importantly, Hazelwood emphasized that “the
education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and
local school officials, and not of federal judges.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 273 (1988). One commentator points out that “[i]n most of the cases citing this facet of
Hazelwood, the [C]ourt held in favor of the administration, using [this] exact quote.” Mel Krutz,
Hazelwood: Results and Realities, in PRESERVING INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM: FIGHTING
CENSORSHIP IN OUR SCHOOLS 223 (Jean E. Brown ed., 1994).
268. Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Peltz forecasted the “chilling
effect” that Hazelwood would have in the context of the college media:
A chilling effect at the college level would of course be disastrous for cutting off vital
forums for information and debate on college campus. But the consequences could be
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Even if Hazelwood Applies, Judge Graber’s Application was
Erroneous

Even assuming, despite the past precedent and policy reasons discussed
above, that Hazelwood was the correct legal standard for the Ninth Circuit to
apply in Brown v. Li, Judge Graber’s application did not comport with the
standards and guidelines set forth in Hazelwood. An analysis of the facts from
Brown under the framework set forth in Hazelwood reveals that the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied.
a.

Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” Did Not Bear the “Imprimatur” of
the School

The Hazelwood Court specifically defined the Hazelwood category of
speech as “expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”269 The
Court noted that school officials are entitled to a great amount of control over
such speech in order “to assure that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.”270 Just how much control can school
officials exercise? According to Hazelwood, school officials can set
“standards that may be higher than those demanded by some . . . publishers . . .
in the ‘real’ world . . . .”271 Contrary to the high school students in Hazelwood,
Brown was operating in the “real” world, far removed from eight-hour school
days, bells ringing, and recess. He had completed high school. He had
completed his undergraduate studies. He was a graduate master’s student, on
the road to publishing his thesis, “The Morphology of Calcium Carbonate,” a
thesis designed to add to the body of knowledge in the professional scientific
community.272 For these and other reasons that will be discussed, it is quite
doubtful that a reasonable third party would come to the conclusion that
Brown’s “Disacknowledgements” section would be attributed to the members
of his thesis committee.273

even more tragic outside the ivy-covered walls. Imagine a generation of college-trained
journalists with no practical experience handling controversial subject matter, nor with
any more than an academic understanding of the role of the Fourth Estate in American
society . . . . [T]he quality of professional journalism would suffer immeasurably.
Peltz, supra note 263, at 534-35.
269. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
270. Id. at 271.
271. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
272. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 943 (9th Cir. 2002).
273. Some might argue that even if this is true, the library still has the ultimate discretion to
determine whether to display such student works on its shelves or in its file cabinets. Although
there is no case on point, in Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, the Court
confronted the issue of whether school officials could remove materials from the library “because
particular passages . . . offended their social, political and moral tastes . . . .” 457 U.S. 853, 858-
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Judge Graber assumed, but did not analyze whether or why, the
“Disacknowledgments” section would be attributed to the school. She
bypassed any analysis of this issue by viewing the content of Brown’s research
as one with the “Disacknowledgments” section.274 Instead, she should have
disassociated the optional “Disacknowledgments” section from the content of
Brown’s work, as a reasonable person reading Brown’s thesis likely would
have done. In the context of the Brown case, the reasonable person for
purposes of analysis is a reasonable (and probably educated) adult reader, as is
suggested by the complexity of his thesis title and the purpose for which the
thesis was being published, namely, to add to existing scientific research. An
argument that such an adult would conclude that the University adopted and
approved of Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” is unsupported. Books, law
review articles, and theses are some examples of works that contain
“Acknowledgments” sections. As is most readily illustrated with bound
works, this section normally appears on a page or pages at the beginning of the
work, often even before the pages containing the table of contents. These
sections normally appear separate from the substance of the work and are
noticeably personal, sometimes naming people of whom and events of which
the reader has no knowledge. Based on both their content and physical
disassociation from the content of the work, the likelihood that such a section
would “bear the imprimatur of the school” is virtually nonexistent.
Moreover, Judge Graber ignored the fact that the school had allowed
another student (“Student A”) to include what was, based on its language,

59 (1982). The Court, after analyzing its precedents, stated: “[School officials] possess
significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries. But that discretion may
not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner. . . . Our Constitution does not permit
the official suppression of ideas.” Id. at 870-71. The Court also stated: “[J]ust as access to ideas
makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a
meaningful manner, such access prepares students for active and effective participation in [our]
pluralistic, often contentious society . . . .” Id. at 868. However, the Court expressly limited its
holding: “[N]othing in our decision today affects in any way the discretion of a local school board
to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools.” Id. at 871. Thus, some may read this
opinion as allowing school officials much discretion in choosing what books to exclude from its
shelves. However, the Court also made another distinction:
[This case] does not involve textbooks . . . . Respondents do not seek in this Court to
impose limitations upon their school Board’s discretion to prescribe the curricula of
the . . . schools. On the contrary, the only books at issue in this case are library books,
books that by their nature are optional rather than required reading.
Id. at 861-62.
Brown’s thesis is more analogous to optional reading than a textbook, for no one would be
compelled to read his thesis. Thus, to the extent that Pico can be read as allowing possible
unfettered discretion to school officials in determining what to add to their library shelves, it is
inapplicable to Brown’s situation.
274. Brown, 308 F.3d at 952.
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more of a “Disacknowledgments” than an “Acknowledgments” section.275
Although Student A did not name any particular school officials, the student’s
“Acknowledgment” section could arguably be characterized by some as more
offensively descriptive than Brown’s. In addition to using profanity, Student A
“acknowledged” some members of the school’s staff by writing “may your
bloated, limb-less bodies wash to shore and be picked clean by seabirds and
maggots.”276 Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” section, in contrast, used no
profanity,277 and the arguably harshest word Brown used to refer to school
officials was “degenerates.”278 Student A’s “Acknowledgments” section,
however, was approved. How the school could argue that Brown’s views, but
not Student A’s, could be attributed to the school remains a mystery. Judge
Graber did not even attempt to account for this inconsistency. Thus, because it
was unlikely that Brown’s “Disacknolwedgments” section would be perceived
by outsiders to bear the imprimatur of the school, the deferential Hazelwood
standard should not have applied.
b.

The Optional “Acknowledgments” Section Was a Limited Public
Forum

Once more, Judge Graber’s analysis suffered from a lack of explanation.
Without any explanation, she concluded: “An academic thesis co-signed by a
committee of professors is not a public forum, limited or otherwise.”279 Judge
Graber’s conclusion is erroneous, however, for she misidentified the proper
forum for analysis.
The Supreme Court has not confined the definition of a forum to physical
locations; instead, a forum can be “metaphysical” and/or an “intangible
channel[] of communication.”280 Thus, for instance, courts have declared that
incorporating a public comment period into a school board agenda and
including an advertising section within a magazine created limited public
forums.281

275. See id. at 967 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 967.
277. Note, however, that his amended “Disacknowledgments” section did not contain
profanity. Id. at 943.
278. Id.
279. Brown, 308 F.3d at 954.
280. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995);
Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 476 (1st Cir. 1989).
281. Rutgers 1000 Alumni Council v. Rutgers, 803 A.2d 679, 687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002) (advertising section); Bach v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Va. Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741
(E.D. Va. 2001) (public comment period). In Bach, the challenged governmental action took the
form of school board bylaws that “prohibit[ed] personal attacks.” Id. at 739. The plaintiffs
contended that while those who criticized school officials would be silenced, another “speaker
would be able to proffer laudatory praises of the school officials without fear of being
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As argued above, the “Acknowledgments” or “Disacknowledgments”
section can be disassociated from the actual substantive and academic portion
of the thesis.282 Because Brown’s expressive activity was regulated only in the
“Disacknowledgments” section,283 that section is the proper basis for the forum
analysis.
Although not a traditional public forum, the “Acknowledgments” section
should have been characterized as a limited public forum, not a nonpublic
forum, as Judge Graber concluded.284 To reach this determination, one must
first analyze the policies and practices of the school and take into account any
clear indication that the school officials did not intend to create a limited public
forum.285 School officials at the University of California at Santa Barbara did
not produce “clear evidence” of a contrary intent. Instead, an examination of
their policies and practices indicates quite the opposite.
First, the university officials, through the school’s thesis Guide, manifested
an intent to create a limited public forum. The language of the policy is
permissive, indicating that the inclusion of an “Acknowledgements” in a
student thesis was optional.286 Although the policy provided for a restriction
on format, the language of the policy did not place any explicit restrictions on
the content of the section. Of course, one may argue that by titling that portion
of the Guide “Dedication and/or Acknowledgments,” the school evidenced
such an intent. However, this by no means establishes the “clear” intent that is
seemingly necessary under the mandates of Cornelius.287 Thus, in the words
of Hazelwood, school officials opened the “Acknowledgment” forum “‘for
indiscriminate use’ . . . by some segment of the public,” namely, all thesis
students.288
Even more compelling were the university officials’ own actions. If their
intent was to limit the content of the “Acknowledgments” section to the sorts
of examples cited in Turabian’s Style Manual, or some variation thereof, the
school failed miserably and obviously did not enforce it with any consistency.
As has already been noted, the record was peppered with examples of
approved student “Acknowledgments” sections that arguably do not fall within

silenced . . . .” Id. at 742. Ultimately, the court agreed and concluded that such “[a] policy that
chills protected speech cannot stand.” Id. at 744.
282. See supra Part IV.A.2.a.
283. Brown, 308 F.3d at 943 (noting that the actual substantive portion of Brown’s thesis was
originally approved by the thesis committee).
284. For a discussion of the differences between these types of forum, see supra Part II.B.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
286. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
287. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). This is
especially true when considered in light of the university’s actual practice.
288. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 46 n.3 (1983)).
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the ambit of their own proffered definition—most notably, the student who, in
so many words, “Acknowledged” the ineptitude of school employees.289 The
school officials’ actions were characterized not by consistency, but by selective
enforcement.
Selective enforcement, however, is exactly what the First Amendment
seeks to avoid. Judge Graber would uphold selective enforcement.290 She
would allow for a lack of uniformity of the enforcement of student free speech
rights based on the level of laxness of a particular overseeing thesis committee.
However, once a limited public forum is established, school officials can
exclude students from the forum based on content, but cannot exclude students
based on their individual viewpoints.291 A simple example illustrates this
point:
When the government builds a theater, for example, it creates a limited public
forum open to theatrical productions. Other forms of expression, such as
petitioning, would not be welcome in a theater, and they could therefore be
excluded on a reasonable basis. The government cannot exclude a particular
theatrical production from the theater, however, without a compelling
justification.292

Contrary to Judge Graber’s conclusion, Brown was excluded because of his
unpopular viewpoints. The school officials cannot argue that their actions
were content-based and not viewpoint-based. If the school officials’ actions or
intentions were content-related, they would have also excluded Student A’s
“Acknowledgments” section, and disciplined him as well.293 The Supreme
Court has made it very clear: “The government must abstain from regulating
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of
the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”294

289. See supra note 159.
290. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “this thesis committee was
entitled to set an academic standard for Plaintiff’s thesis, including it acknowledgments section,
even if no thesis committee in the past ever had set one.”).
291. See supra text accompanying note 78.
292. Rudy, supra note 67, at 1261 (footnotes omitted).
293. A similar argument and analysis was advanced in Bach v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Va.
Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. Va. 2001). In Bach, plaintiffs claimed that the school’s
regulations “prohibiting ‘personal attacks’ during the public comment period of School Board
meetings” constituted an unconstitutional infringement on their First Amendment right to free
speech. Id. at 739. However, although factually distinguishable from Brown, the court’s analysis
and reasoning is instructive. Per the contested provision in Bach, a speaker could not criticize the
school administration. Id. at 742. However, similar to the effect of the provision in Brown, “[a]t
the same time, a speaker would be able to proffer laudatory praises of the school officials without
fear of being silenced, because the contested provision places no corresponding ban on statements
that promote or inflate the honesty, integrity, or character of a named official.” Id.
294. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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The policies and practices of the school officials manifested an intent to
create a limited public forum. Once that public forum was created, the school
officials were bound to its terms. By punishing Brown because of his
“Disacknowledgments” section, the officials overstepped those bounds, and in
doing so, violated the letter and the spirit of the First Amendment.
c.

Even if the “Acknowledgments” Section was a Non-public Forum, the
University’s Actions Constituted Impermissible Viewpoint
Discrimination

Assuming, arguendo, that Judge Graber was correct in concluding that the
thesis as a whole constituted a nonpublic forum, the university’s actions still
amounted to an infringement of Brown’s First Amendment free speech rights.
According to traditional public forum analysis, viewpoint discrimination is
impermissible even in the context of a nonpublic forum.295 However, a circuit
split has developed over whether the notion of viewpoint neutrality is required
when analyzing nonpublic forums under the rubric of Hazelwood.296 The First
and the Third Circuits are among those circuits that have concluded viewpoint
discrimination is allowed in Hazelwood-type cases; the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits are among those who mandate viewpoint neutrality.297 The Ninth
295. Janna J. Annest, Note and Comment, Only the News That’s Fit to Print: The Effect of
Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public SchoolSponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (2002).
296. Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). For an
analysis of the interplay of Hazelwood and the viewpoint neutrality requirement, see Annest,
supra note 295.
297. Downs, 228 F.3d. at 1011 n.2. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained:
[The Perry Court held that the school] may regulate speech on that property only if the
regulation is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression due to the view
expressed . . . . [W]hile citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, the Court in Kuhlmeier did not require
that school regulation of school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral.
Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit agreed, stating:
Hazelwood clearly stands for the proposition that educators may impose non-viewpoint
neutral restrictions on the content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as those restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns . . . . Under Hazelwood, “[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control
over . . . student expression” when it is elicited as part of a teacher-supervised, schoolsponsored activity. In that specific environment, viewpoint neutrality is neither necessary
nor appropriate, as the school is there [sic] responsible for “determin[ing] the content of
the education it provides.”
C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172-73 (3rd Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (quoting Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) and Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833, vacated en
banc, 226 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2000)). See also Annest, supra note 290, at 1246 n.194 (“The Third
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court regarding the events . . . which had given rise
to the panel’s discussion of Hazelwood. The panel analysis of Hazelwood thus remains as
persuasive authority on the circuit’s position.”) (citations omitted). On the other hand, the Sixth
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Circuit has authority that might be read to support both positions. For
example, in Chandler v. McMinnville, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit did not even mention viewpoint neutrality in explaining that
Hazelwood held that “federal courts are to defer to a school’s decision to
suppress or punish vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive speech, and to
‘disassociate itself’ from speech that a reasonable person would view as
bearing the imprimatur of the school . . . .”298 In Planned Parenthood v. Clark
County School District, however, the court of appeals “incorporated ‘viewpoint
neutrality’ analysis into nonpublic forum, school-sponsored speech cases.”299
However, although it dealt with school-sponsorship, this was not a Hazelwood
case, and thus, is not necessarily controlling.300
In Brown, Judge Graber took the position that viewpoint neutrality was not
required. However, the circuit split should be resolved in favor of requiring
viewpoint neutrality. First, allowing viewpoint discrimination makes the
already deferential Hazelwood standard even more deferential. Student rights
would be left to the whims of school officials. Moreover, viewpoint neutrality
has been incorporated into the forum analysis for quite some time, and a
departure from this would not comport with the concept of stare decisis. In
fact, the absence of any discussion of viewpoint neutrality and discrimination
in Hazelwood has even been called a “curious omission.”301 It is quite
possible, however, that the Court did not discuss the issue because it felt that it
was settled and did not warrant any further discussion. Maybe the omission
was not so curious after all. As the Eleventh Circuit best articulated the
reason: “[T]here is no indication that the [Hazelwood] Court intended to

and Eleventh Circuits disagree. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 1999)
(vacated en banc, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The Court in Hazelwood noted . . . that if the
school did not intentionally create a public forum, then the publication remains a nonpublic
forum, and school officials may impose any reasonable, non-viewpoint-based restriction on
student speech exhibited therein.”)); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“Although Hazelwood provides reasons for allowing a school official to discriminate based on
content, we do not believe it offers any justification for allowing educators to discriminate based
on viewpoint. The prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is firmly embedded in first
amendment analysis . . . . Without more explicit direction, we will continue to require school
officials to make decisions relating to speech which are viewpoint neutral.”) (citations omitted).
298. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992). However, this
language was dicta. See Downs, 228 F.3d at 1011.
299. Id. at 1010-11 (discussing Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch.
Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 828 n.19, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1991)).
300. Planned Parenthood involved school educators’ refusals to accept advertisements for
Planned Parenthood in student yearbooks, newspapers, and athletic programs. Id. at 1010.
Although noting the split, the court did not reach the issue in Downs, for the court concluded
neither Hazelwood nor Planned Parenthood was applicable “because it is a case of the
government itself speaking.” Id. at 1011.
301. Peltz, supra note 263, at 506.
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drastically rewrite First Amendment law to allow a school official to
discriminate based on a speaker’s views.”302
Assuming that this was the correct standard, the University’s actions in
Brown would violate the First Amendment, for the same reasons stated
above.303
d.

University’s Actions Needed to be Reasonably Related to Legitimate
Pedagogical Goals

Even assuming Judge Graber correctly decided that the
“Acknowledgments” section did not constitute a limited public forum and that
Hazelwood does not require viewpoint neutrality, the University’s actions in
regulating Brown’s speech should have failed under the terms of the
Hazelwood standard. The Hazelwood decision itself suggests that to be
illegitimate, the University’s actions would have to serve “no valid educational
purpose.”304 Although this guidance from Hazelwood suggests that school
officials’ decisions about what is legitimate or not will rarely be disturbed, the
facts of Brown suggest that this might be one of those rare cases.
Judge Graber concluded that the University’s legitimate pedagogical
objective was “teaching [Brown] the proper format for a scientific paper.”305
However, the content of Brown’s “Disacknowledgments” section arguably has
nothing to do with the proper format of a scientific paper. Moreover, the fact
that an “Acknowledgments” section is disassociated from the content of the
thesis student’s scientific research and scientific conclusions only further
bolsters this argument.306 It seems illogical to argue, as Judge Graber does,
that if masters’ students have not learned the “skill” of writing an optional
acknowledgments section, “they are not qualified to receive advanced degrees
in chemistry.”307 Moreover, one could argue that no legitimate pedagogical
reason exists because the educational purpose sought to be furthered by a
master’s thesis is independent thought and analysis, not conformity.308
302. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 290-94.
304. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
305. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002).
306. See supra Part IV.A.2.a.
307. Brown, 308 F.3d at 959-60 n.3 (Reinhardt, J., and dissenting).
308. Peltz made a similar argument in the context of the applicability of Hazelwood to college
media/publications:
A “no legitimate pedagogical concerns” argument might succeed at the college level for
the very reason that Hazelwood was an unwise decision to begin with: practical
experience with editorial freedom and responsibility is an essential component of an
education in journalism. Of course, the same argument pertains at the high-school level
and failed to stop Hazelwood. But the argument might be stronger at the college level.
Employers in journalism specifically look for experienced candidates, and the collegiate
journalism academy emphasizes the importance of on-the-job training.
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Even assuming Judge Graber was correct in deciding that the University
articulated a legitimate pedagogical goal, in order for the University’s actions
to be upheld, the actions had to be reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
goals.309 Judge Graber concluded that Brown’s “thesis was subject to a
reviewing committee’s reasonable regulation” and that Brown “was given
reasonable standards for that assignment.”310 However, Judge Graber did not
explain how she came to this conclusion. As the dissent points out, the
University’s extreme actions could hardly be “reasonably related” to any
legitimate pedagogical goal. Not only did the University officials decide not to
confer Brown’s degree, but they also put him on academic probation, which
prevented him from researching, teaching, or getting financial aid.311 What
goal the University attempted to accomplish by imposing such an unreasonable
sanction is unclear. The reasonable relation between the University’s actions
and the goal of teaching Brown how to write a scientific paper in the proper
format is tenuous, if not nonexistent.
Thus, in performing the Hazelwood analysis, Judge Graber, at the least,
should have recognized that there were questions of fact pertaining to the
reason for the University’s harsh sanctions. At the least, this suggests that
summary judgment should not have been granted.
B.

Proposed Standards

Judge Reinhardt’s dissent best accommodated the need to vigorously
safeguard free speech rights in the university setting. First, he correctly
pointed out that Judge Graber’s extracurricular-curricular distinction was not
supported by Hazelwood-type caselaw. Moreover, he did what Judge Graber
failed to do—he gave recognition to the potentially pretextual bases for the
school officials’ actions. Most importantly, he attempted to delineate proposed
standards that would accommodate the competing interests, instead of just
trying to cram Brown into a framework in which, because of the deep-seeded
distinctions between the pre-collegiate and collegiate level, it plainly did not
fit. In short, instead of just ignoring the problems created by the application of
Hazelwood at the post-secondary level, Judge Reinhardt tried to create
solutions.
Assuming Hazelwood is the erroneous legal standard to apply in postsecondary free speech cases leaves the following question unanswered: What
Peltz, supra note 263, at 549. Of course, one can argue that Judge Graber did not need to provide
much explanation for why the University’s actions were reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical goals because the Hazelwood standard, by its terms, provides much deference to
school officials. However, this argument only underscores the policy reasons case law warranting
the inapplicability of Hazelwood in the post-secondary setting. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.
309. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
310. Brown, 308 F.3d at 952 (emphasis added).
311. Id. at 965 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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should take its place? Following are some proposed standards, including those
proffered by Judge Graber, accompanied by critiques.312
1.

Modified Hazelwood

It may be that the Supreme Court, if it ever decides to close the gap in
post-secondary free speech jurisprudence created by Hazelwood’s seventh
footnote, would be hesitant in straying from the Hazelwood framework. The
Court might still want to perpetuate the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood distinction
in the post-secondary setting, but with some sensitivity to the pre-collegiate
and post-secondary distinctions.313 As it now stands, Hazelwood weighs
heavily in favor of high school officials. One proposed solution would be to
implement some sort of modified Hazelwood standard when analyzing postsecondary free speech claims. The Eleventh Circuit attempted to do just that in
Bishop v. Aronov, giving teacher autonomy more weight than probably would
have been considered in a high school Hazelwood case.314 Analogously, when

312. The following proposed standards advocate judicial activism more than judicial restraint.
Some commentators suggest that judicial restraint is the proper solution. See, e.g., Michael
Rebell, Tinker, Hazelwood and the Remedial Role of the Courts in Education Litigation, 69 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 539 (1995).
The reconciliation of the values of autonomy and authority has to come at the community
level . . . . [A] judge ought to establish a remedial process that brings a broad
representative group of people from the affected community together, and set up a special
master, a facilitator or some representative of the court, as a liaison between the
community and the court to ensure that there is a proper dialogue.
Id. at 549. Although this solution may be proper at the pre-collegiate level, it would not be a
workable solution at the post-secondary level. Community involvement at colleges and
universities is likely not as prevalent as it is at the primary and secondary levels. Moreover, there
is a greater judicial interest in oversight at the post-secondary level because school officials are
not acting in loco parentis with respect to undergraduate and graduate students.
313. Tinker, of course, would apply in situations where the expressive activity is deemed to
be “political,” Fraser, where the activity is deemed to be “sexual or offensive,” and Hazelwood,
where the activity is deemed to bear the imprimatur of the school. See supra Part II.A.
314. The Eleventh Circuit attempted to do just this in Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074
(11th Cir. 1991) (“[I]nsofar as [the Hazelwood standard] covers the extent to which an institution
may limit in-school expressions which suggest the school’s approval, we adopt the Court’s
reasoning as suitable to our ends, even at the university level.”). Although Bishop involved
academic freedom, it is still instructive. In applying a purportedly modified Hazelwood standard,
the Bishop court said it would take into account the “context” (the dynamics of the university
classroom, including “the coercive effect upon students [by] a professor’s speech”), “the
University’s position as a public employer which may reasonably restrict the speech rights of
employees more readily than the those [sic] of other persons,” and “the strong predilection for
academic freedom as an adjunct of the free speech rights of the First Amendment.” Id. at 107475. However, even though this standard was “modified,” it still led to much deference toward
school officials’ decisions in its application. Id. at 1075 (noting “in any event, we cannot
supplant our discretion for that of the University”). Thus, although the court seemingly tried to
be progressive, it ended up being too traditional. The court itself even noted that it could have
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considering the totality of the circumstances in applying the Hazelwood test at
the post-secondary level, the Court could decide instead to tip the balance more
in favor of the student. For example, the unique environment of the postsecondary educational setting, including the fact that undergraduate and
graduate students are more mature, and the amorphous notion of the
“marketplace of ideas,” should weigh more heavily in the Hazelwood analysis.
The California Court of Appeals, in DiBona v. Matthews, similarly interpreted
Hazelwood to apply in a modified fashion in the post-secondary setting.315
Ultimately, the court concluded, without much further explanation or guidance,
that “school sponsorship is a factor which under some circumstances can be
considered at the college level,” and that “[a]lthough the ‘legitimate
pedagogical concerns’ at the college and university level may be more limited
than in elementary and secondary schools, they are not nonexistent.”316
However, because the school officials would still retain a considerable
amount of discretion and deference, a modified standard would likely not give
full recognition to the policy reasons against extending Hazelwood to the postsecondary setting.317
2.

Totally Tinker

A second proposed solution to fill the Hazelwood hole would be to apply
the Tinker standard to all student free speech claims at the post-secondary
level. Accordingly, school officials would only be able to prohibit expressive
activity if they could proffer “evidence that it is necessary to avoid material
and substantial interference with the schoolwork or discipline . . . .”318 This
standard is more protective of students’ free speech rights than Hazelwood, and
seems to recognize and compensate for the underlying differences between

provided more deference to teachers but did not. Id. at 1072 n.5 (citing Gregory A. Clarick, Note,
Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 693 (1990)) (“The [Clarick] article suggests a balancing approach somewhat like the one we
will endeavor to apply. The article, however, weighs teacher autonomy more heavily than we
have concluded is proper under Kuhlmeier.”). For a discussion of the facts of Bishop, see supra
note 139.
315. DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329 (Ct. App. 1990). The DiBona court gave
more weight to the student’s First Amendment rights than the Bishop court gave to the teacher’s
First Amendment rights when comparing them to a school official’s rights. Citing Healy and
Papish as authoritative law, the DiBona court expressed doubt whether a showing of “school
sponsorship” would warrant the rationale of Hazelwood’s “wholesale extension to educational
settings involving adults.” Id. at 1346-47.
316. Id. at 1347.
317. For a discussion of these policy arguments, see supra Part IV.A.1.b.
318. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (emphasis
added). According to this test, “school officials cannot suppress ‘expressions of feelings with
which they do not wish to contend.’” Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
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primary/secondary and undergraduate/graduate students. For example, some
argue that Tinker embraces the ideology of “progressivism”—an ideology that
is characteristic of the higher educational environment.319 However, such a
total application of the Tinker standard to all types of free speech claims is not
supported by the caselaw, for Tinker has been limited to “political messages”
that do not bear the imprimatur of the school.320 Thus, it is highly unlikely that
the Court would extend Tinker in such a manner.
3.

Limited Public Forum

The first proposed alternative Judge Reinhardt suggested is to apply the
limited public forum analysis to all regulations of student speech at the postsecondary level.321 However, the Supreme Court would unlikely be prepared
to make a blanket declaration that all speech in the university setting fits into
the rubric of the public forum analysis. As no requirement of viewpoint
neutrality could “drastically rewrite First Amendment law,” so, too, could this.
4.

Intermediate Level of Scrutiny

The second alternative that Judge Reinhardt suggested as more protective
of post-secondary students’ rights was “an intermediate level of scrutiny for
regulations of student speech in college and graduate programs.”322
Comparing Brown to United States v. Virginia, a Supreme Court case applying
intermediate scrutiny in the equal protection context, Judge Reinhardt stated
that under this standard, “the university would have the burden of
demonstrating that its regulation of college and graduate student speech was
substantially related to an important pedagogical purpose.”323 Judge Reinhardt

319. Senhauser, supra note 256, at 954-56 (arguing that the Tinker court “implicitly” applied
progressivism and “discounted both the inculcative interest of the state and the alleged
immaturity of students at the secondary educational level . . . .”).
320. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002).
321. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
322. Id. Intermediate scrutiny is to be contrasted with strict scrutiny, which requires that the
law in question both serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet
that goal. Alternatively, minimum rationality “requires that the law in question have a rational
relationship to a legitimate public purpose or government interest.” Heather J. Lorenz, Comment,
The Key to Unlocking the Schoolhouse Doors: Intermediate Scrutiny, the Appropriate Standard
of Review for Race-Conscious Desegregation Policies, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 169, 178-79 (2000)
(citing Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-2, 16-6, at 1439-40, 1451-52
(2d ed. 1988)).
323. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533 (1996)). In the equal protection context, the court has applied this standard to “laws
involving affirmative action, laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, and occasionally, laws
that discriminate against aliens, nonmarital children, and individuals with mental disabilities.”
Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 316-17 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
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implied that this standard would strike a more equal balance than a limited
public forum analysis.324 He stated that although it provided more deference to
school officials than the limited public forum, an intermediate level of scrutiny
provided more protection for students’ free speech rights than Hazelwood.325
In actuality, the intermediate scrutiny standard applied in the First
Amendment context would be slightly different than the standard Judge
Reinhardt articulated, depending on the type of regulation at issue.326 If the
Supreme Court was of the opinion that students’ First Amendment rights are
equally as important as school officials’ interests in regulating such speech, it
would likely adopt this standard. Although an intermediate level of scrutiny
strikes the fairest balance between school official and student rights,327 it is a
standard that is highly likely to yield inconsistent results.328 In addition, an
adoption of this standard by the Court is seemingly inconsistent with its preHazelwood pronouncements regarding student free speech rights in the
university setting.329
5.

Back to the Basics: Healy and Papish

Finally, the Supreme Court could return to two of its precedents that are
still cited today, which would allow school officials a limited amount of
324. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964.
325. Id.
326. Wexler, supra note 323, at 318 n.129. In First Amendment jurisprudence, intermediate
scrutiny has applied to content-neutral regulations, time, place, and manner regulations, and
regulations of commercial speech. Id. at 317. If the regulation related to commercial speech, the
regulation must “‘directly advance[] the governmental interest asserted,’” and be no “‘more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.’” Id. at 318 n.129 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). If the regulation being
challenged is content-neutral, the regulation must further the interest and be “‘no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.’” Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968)). Finally, if the regulation is one of time, place, or manner, the Court “additionally
requires that the speaker have adequate alternative channels for his or her expression.” Id. (citing
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)).
327. Wexler, supra note 323, at 318 (“The most striking feature of intermediate scrutiny is
that, unlike strict scrutiny or rationality review, the tier of scrutiny that the Court decides to apply
does not predetermine the outcome of the case; with intermediate scrutiny, sometimes the state
wins, and sometimes it loses.”).
328. Of course this is true, at least to some extent, with all standards/tests that courts apply.
However, the intermediate level of scrutiny seems particularly susceptible to this “problem.” Id.
at 322. Wexler noted,
Intermediate scrutiny facilitates and encourages narrow decisionmaking by requiring the
Court to focus its attention on the facts of particular cases. This practice means that each
new case will generally not be predetermined by previous cases and that the decision in
any given case will not resolve many issues in future cases.
Id.
329. In these pre-Hazelwood cases, the Court suggested that free speech rights should apply
with full force in the post-secondary setting. See infra Part II.C.
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authority to regulate expressive activity while safeguarding the First
Amendment rights of post-secondary students. Thus, it would accommodate
both competing interests, albeit with the balance most definitely tipped in favor
of students instead of school officials.
Both Healy and Papish recognized that post-secondary students should be
afforded the same First Amendment protection as adults. For example, in
Healy, the Court specifically stressed in its opinion that First Amendment free
speech rights should apply with equal force on post-secondary campuses as
they apply to members of society at large.330 To accomplish this, the Court
emphasized that there is a heavy burden on school officials to justify their
actions when they impose restraints on student free speech at the postsecondary level.331 Likewise, in Papish, the Court emphatically stated that
“the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in
the academic community with respect to the content of speech . . . .”332
Although Healy and Papish provide some general standards for the lower
courts to follow, the Court could instead craft more explanatory and expansive
guidelines from the rhetoric of these cases and use them as a starting point for
developing a well-entrenched, post-secondary free speech jurisprudence.
Ultimately, this would be the ideal solution for the unanswered footnote seven
in Hazelwood. Whereas the deferential Hazelwood standard recognizes the
unique primary and secondary school setting, a new standard emanating from
Healy and Papish would be more student-friendly, recognizing the uniqueness
of the post-secondary setting.
V. CONCLUSION
“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”333 In Brown,
preservation of the status quo prevailed. However, in all cases involving
student speech, especially at the post-secondary level, this pronouncement is
particularly instructive. In every case, competing interests must be balanced
and assessed, and for the courts, this surely is no simple feat. As the statement
makes clear, however, the First Amendment exists to protect those who might
otherwise remain unprotected, especially when those individuals espouse
unpopular beliefs. That protection should no less be afforded to postsecondary students.

330. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
331. Id. at 184.
332. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973).
333. Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of Columbine,
77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2000) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
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Of course, the rights of professors cannot be ignored.334 The amorphous
concept of “academic freedom” is, some would argue, an equally entrenched
right.335 How should the professors’ rights be balanced into the equation? At
present, academic freedom jurisprudence is also in a state of disarray, for the
Supreme Court has failed to clearly delineate the parameters of professors’
rights.336 Some courts even apply the deferential Hazelwood standard to
academic freedom cases,337 leading at least one commentator to conclude that
“[t]he net effect of [this application] is the subtle infantilization of teachers.”338
The same effect results when courts apply the Hazelwood standard to
determine the scope of undergraduate and graduate students’ rights. To avoid
these ill-fated consequences, both professors and students must be viewed in
light of what they are—adults. Ultimately, there is no easy solution when the
rights of professors and students clash. Under any of the proposed standards,
one thing remains clear: Students’ rights should weigh heavily in determining
the outcome of any given case.
The time has come for the Supreme Court to speak so that undergraduate
and graduate students may speak without fear of adverse consequences. As
one court declared: “‘It is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions’” and
“[t]his includes the ability to question the fitness of the community leaders,
including the administrative leaders in a school system.”339 However, for

334. For example, one can imagine a situation where a student sues a professor, alleging a
violation of First Amendment free speech rights because of a poor grade that the student received
on, for example, a paper advocating the student’s views.
335. For a more in-depth discussion of academic freedom jurisprudence, see Karen C. Daly,
Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2001).
336. Id. at 5-6.
337. Id. at 16 n.84 (citing Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724
(8th Cir. 1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2nd
Cir. 1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944
F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 112, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008
(7th Cir. 1990)).
338. Id. at 16.
339. Bach v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 743 (E.D. Va. 2001) (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). At issue in Bach was a school regulation
that prohibited, inter alia, “attacks or accusations regarding the honesty, character, integrity or
other like personal attributes of any identified individual or group” during the public comment
period at school board meetings. Id. at 740 n.1. In addition, the regulation mandated that
individuals “[r]efrain from words or statements which, from their usual construction and common
acceptance, are construed as insults and tend to violence or breach of the peace.” Id. (emphasis
added). The court noted that the school had created a limited public forum. Id. at 741. The court
held that the regulation prohibiting personal attacks was unconstitutional, “for a policy that deters
individuals from speaking out on an issue of public importance violates the First Amendment.”
Id. at 743 (citing Sec. of St. of Md. v. Joseph Hunson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984)).
Analogous to the situation in Bach, Brown criticized school officials, at least implicitly, for the
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almost fifteen years, the Court has left lower courts, school officials, and, most
importantly, undergraduate and graduate students wondering about the scope
of their rights. This has, as one might expect, led to both inconsistent and
unfair results. Whatever standard the Supreme Court chooses to apply, it must
recognize that post-secondary students are adults who deserve to be treated like
adults, both in and outside of the classroom.
Some may still view Brown as an insignificant case—a case of a bitter
student, dissatisfied with his educational experience, who vented his
frustrations in the wrong place at the wrong time. Brown, however, is anything
but an insignificant case. If criticisms from those like Brown are not protected,
more socially acceptable or politically correct criticisms will also be in
danger.340 Still, many will argue that Brown should have written a letter to the
editor instead of including a “Disacknowledgments” section with his thesis. In
the view of many, an adoption of Judge Reinhardt’s analysis, if taken to its
logical extreme, would lead this country down the proverbial “slippery slope.”
Whenever a student is dissatisfied with a grade, he or she could attempt to hide
behind the cloak of the First Amendment and could repeatedly sue professors
for unsatisfactory grades, claiming that the professor did not agree with the
views expressed therein. To some, allowing the Browns of the world to prevail
would merely be a manifestation of freedom run amok. However, “[t]here
is . . . a philosophical and practical commitment to [such] ‘hazardous
freedom . . . that is the basis of our national strength.’ If we want that strength
to last, this commitment belongs as much in our schools as it does anywhere in
our society.”341
LAURA K. SCHULZ*
manner in which they conducted school affairs. As in Bach, this is arguably just as much of an
issue of public importance.
340. Justice Black made this point in his dissenting opinion in Communist Party of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). (“I do
not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and
assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or
later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”).
341. Ramey, supra note 333, at 711 (omission in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969)).
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